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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Violence and politics are inherently intertwined concepts. One can often be a 
catalyst for the other; violence can be used to achieve desired political outcomes, and 
politics can be used to end conflict. An effective political system can disincentivise the 
use of violence, while an ineffective one can encourage it. Within this analysis, I attempt 
to explore the relationship between security concerns and political development in three 
case studies: Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Senegal. These three countries have similar 
colonial histories, similar independence processes, though Guinea did become 
independent two years earlier, and are all located in the same region. Importantly, each 
country has come into existence relatively recently, between 1958 and 1960, and has thus 
gone through large political developments throughout its existence as it has adapted from 
the initial institutions set up by independence leaders. Each case study has predictably 
had quite different paths in both political development and security threats, and an 
entirely different relationship between these two concepts.  
Before delving into the separate case studies, it is prudent to first discuss briefly 
the concept of security within this paper. Security within the developing world is 
naturally different than the traditional view of security found within the western world. 
The traditional view of national or state security is understood in terms of the physical 
protection of states from external threats, including war, border conflicts, espionage, 
sabotage, subversion and other threats that could be operationalized by actual or potential 
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adversaries.1 In the developing world, these security threats can be augmented by 
regional insecurity and weakness of the state’s military powers, which heightens external 
vulnerabilities. However, the discussions of security crises in the following analysis will 
focus almost exclusively on internal security concerns, not external threats.  
 In analyzing security in the developing world, it is useful to change the analysis 
from a power or capability centric metric, such as weapons capabilities or military size, 
and move towards a metric that is based more on sociopolitical cohesiveness, as 
presented by Barry Buzan in his paper “People, States, and Fear: The National Security 
Problem in the Third World.” Buzan separates states into four categories: very weak 
states, ordinary weak states, middle ground states, and strong states. Very weak states are 
the typical definition of an anarchical state, with neither a widely accepted nor coherent 
idea of the state among the population, and no governing power strong enough to impose 
unity in the absence of a political consensus.2 Ordinary weak states, which I argue 
contains the three states within this analysis, generally contain a governing power that 
can override a domestic environment where political identities are more strongly tied 
towards tribal, ethnic, political, or religious groups than to the state itself.3 Middle ground 
states contain a widespread identification among the people of the idea and institutions of 
the state, yet still contain strong political identities that can occasionally clash violently 
with the central government.4 Strong states contain a synthesis of state and society, a 
                                                           
1Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and 
External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), 3.  
2 Barry Buzan, “People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World,” in National 
Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, ed. Edward Azar and 
Chung-in Moon (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), 19.  
3 Barry Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 19. 
4 Ibid., 20. 
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difficult trait to develop in the relatively newly inaugurated states found in French West 
Africa.  
 When looking at security concerns related to sociopolitical cohesiveness over 
aspects of power itself, security risks move from external threats to threats to the 
sociopolitical climate within the state: political violence, major changes in the structure 
of political institutions, visible use of force by the state in domestic life, large role for 
political police in everyday situations, major political conflict over state ideology, lack of 
a coherent national identity or the presence of competing national identities, lack of a 
clear hierarchy for political authority, and a high degree of state control over the media.5  
 On the weaker end of the spectrum for sociopolitical cohesiveness, the concept of 
security can become entangled with the idea of state or regime security. Big concerns 
within the regime security specter include military coups, guerilla movements, 
secessionist movements, mass uprisings, and political factionalism.6 Since many threats 
posed are threats to the governing power’s ability to continue its hold on power, it is easy 
to treat the two terms as synonymous. However, within this analysis, while issues of 
regime security do count as a security crisis, the focus of security concerns will be more 
heavily based on insecurity for the population within a country. The internal instability of 
a regime collapse or threat of collapse will have very negative effects for the safety of the 
citizens, and will be included in the discussion for this reason. Also included lens when 
the safety of the citizenry is the focus is also the abuses of the government on their own 
populace, as we will see within the Guinea and Senegal case studies.  
                                                           
5 Ibid., 21. 
6 Ibid., 24. 
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 Similar to the concept of security, it is also necessary to describe what political 
development alludes to within this analysis, as it can be an equally vague term with a 
multitude of valid definitions. Generally speaking, political development is the analysis 
of the trends of change of political institutions within this country. In this work, the focus 
will be on how the political development has changed specifically in terms of public 
participation and the ability of the citizens to have an input or control in their governance, 
as well as how much governing institutions evolve to benefit the population rather than 
focusing on, say, solidifying and maintaining power. As well, political stability and 
durability are also important factors. Included within this analysis of political 
development is the fostering of civil society, presence of opposition parties, electoral 
processes, and how the country handles period of political uncertainty, such as matters of 
succession.  
 Using these metrics, this paper will first analyze the foundations of political 
institutions within the three states by exploring the creation of nationalist leaders in the 
pre-independence era, and how their personal development within these years affected 
their governance style after independence. Afterwards, the discussion will separate into 
the three distinct case studies. The purpose of this analysis is to first outline the major 
developments within each country in the political field, highlight the major security 
concerns within the country, and then analyze how these two sectors have affected the 
other, or if they have not, why there has been little connection between the two. 
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Chapter 2: Colonial Administration 
 
The rise of African involvement in colonial political administration exploded after 
the end of the second World War, when France opened up the territorial government to 
include more input from Africans themselves. In these postwar years, the French political 
system in the colonies evolved away from the direct, authoritarian rule of the pre-war 
French colonial administration to become more closely related to a parliamentary system. 
Charles de Gaulle expressed this administrative evolution at the Brazzaville conference in 
1944: “We are certain that there will be no progress if the peoples who live on their 
native land cannot profit from it both materially and morally, if this development does 
not bring them more closely associated with the directions of their own affairs.”7 From 
the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, Africans gained rights to electoral politics, trade-union 
organization, and more universal citizenship.8 These transformations allowed African 
voters to elect delegates to the National Assembly, to the Assembly of the French Union, 
to the Grand Councils in Dakar and Brazzaville, and to the territorial assemblies. By 
1958, voters had expressed their opinions on four referenda, two constitutions, three 
National Assemblies, and three territorial assemblies. African representatives were able 
to twice elect members to the Assembly of the French Union, thrice to the federal grand 
council, and thrice to the French Senate.9 While representation by Africans was still 
relatively modest—for example, in the 1945 convention of the Constitutional Assembly, 
                                                           
7 Ernest Milcent, “Senegal,” in African One-Party States, ed. Gwendolyn M. Carter (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1962), 95. 
8 Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1995 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 139. 
9 Manning. Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 140. 
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only 6 Africans represented the 18 million French West African population—these 
changes did represent the first time that the colonial regime allowed French Africans to 
contribute to the institutions that directed their lives.10 
 Following the opening of political participation in the colonies, there soon 
developed dominant African personalities in colonial politics. As territorial assemblies 
became more powerful and the number of African political groups increased, the future 
leaders of the soon-to-be independent African states gained invaluable political 
experience and developed their political following throughout their maneuvering within 
the individual territories as well as through the interterritorial politics of the French West 
African administrative stage. The three dominant political figures in Guinea, Senegal and 
Côte D’Ivoire post-independence—Sékou Touré, Léopold Senghor, and Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, respectively—all developed their bases of support and gained key 
political experience through their political activities in the pre-independence years. 
Léopold Sédar Senghor, the head of the nationalist movement in Senegal, and subsequent 
first president of Senegal, entered politics as one of the first African representatives to be 
elected in the National Assembly in 1945. He was previously unknown in Senegalese 
political circles, and a curious personality to enter the Senegalese nationalist movement, 
“a forty-year-old university teacher who had lived in France for nearly twenty years, who 
had acquired a French wife and citizenship, and whose claim to prominence was his 
reputation as one of France’s leading young poets, hardly seemed the man who would 
come to master brokerage politics with a subtlety and skill matched by few other African 
                                                           
10 Milcent, “Senegal,” 95. 
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leaders.”11 Senghor had many identities: African and French intellectual, “man of the 
bush”, Serer, political animal. He rose in prominence as a political leader after founding 
his own political party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), to oppose the then-
dominant Senegalese section of the French Socialist Party, SFIO, which was led by 
Lamine Guèye.12 Senghor’s politics were always heavily based in his political 
philosophy, which envisioned a society that combined European technology and African 
communal values to create a more humanistic socialism.13 Senghor was a master of 
balancing his various identities to connect with many different groups in Senegal, from 
the rural peasants to the urban elites. However, he had no interest in creating a single, 
unified movement for nationalism in Senegal—something which would have been more 
difficult in the extremely diversified and competitive tribal society found within the 
territory—and instead focused his energies into brokerage politics, balancing the different 
forces under the overarching umbrella of BDS.  
 Côte D’Ivoire’s Houphouët-Boigny was an early political leader, and maintained 
his strong control and influence in Ivoirian politics through to his death in 1993. Less 
outwardly passionate than many of the other African leaders, “his quiet self-assurance 
helped to bring people around to his view. But it was the fact that he could point to what 
he had accomplished, the abolition of forced labor, the bringing about of reconciliation 
with the French administration, and then the long string of successful economic projects, 
that steadily built up his reputation as the supernaturally ‘wise of man’ of the country.”14 
                                                           
11 J. Cartwright, Political Leadership in Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 126 
12 Milcent, “Senegal,” 97. 
13 Cartwright, Political Leadership, 127. 
14 Ibid., 102.  
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He first entered politics after founding Côte D’Ivoire’s earliest political party, the 
Syndicat Africain Agricole (SAA), to defend the rights of smaller African farmers against 
the interests of the large French agricultural companies. Houphouët grew the SAA into an 
effective political coalition, changing the smaller, narrowly focused political party into 
the nationalist Parti Démocratique de la Côte D’Ivoire (PDCI), which was the Ivoirian 
branch of the dominant French West African political coalition, the Rassemblement 
Démocratique Africain (RDA). Houphouët developed the PDCI into an extremely 
efficient political organization, with local cells throughout the region, excellent 
communications, and an ability to mobilize supporters quickly.15 As a representative in 
the French Constituent Assembly, Houphouët’s passage of a bill to abolish forced labor 
in the overseas territories—a minor issue for metropolitan France, but hugely important 
to the African population—along with his entrance into the National Assembly, 
catapulted him into prominence in both thIvoirian politics and the interterritorial RDA 
movement.16 In the initial stages of his political activity, Houphouët strongly allied the 
RDA with the French Communist Party, leading to harassment from the anti-Communist 
French. This included the imprisonment of activists, banning of the party’s right to 
association, bribing of prominent figures within the organization, and even falsifying of 
elections.17 This persecution gave Houphouët a stronger status as a nationalist leader, 
“French repression further enhanced Houphouet-Boigny’s heroic stature. Not only had he 
fought for and won African rights, but in doing so he had not been arrested, and this had 
                                                           
15 Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 143. 
16 Robert. J. Mundt, “Côte D’Ivoire: Continuity and Change in a Semi-Democracy,” in Political Reform in 
Francophone Africa, ed. John F. Clark (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 183. 
17 Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 141-3.  
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showed himself to be as powerful as the Frenchmen. With these credentials, he could 
afford to compromise with the French and yet remain secure from most attacks.”18 And 
compromise he did. After years of harassment, Houphouët decided that the benefits of the 
alliance with the Communists had come to an end and reconfigured the party’s 
associations with the French metropole, establishing strong connections to the French 
government and business community. This ushered in in a honeymoon period for 
relations between France and Côte D’Ivoire, leading the colony to financial security, even 
outdistancing Senegal in economic development.19 Houphouët’s willingness to radically 
alter the party did not reflect his compliance with the French government, but rather his 
focus on achieving his vision for Côte D’Ivoire, a vision that was heavily motivated by 
economic stability and growth.  
 Whereas descriptions of Houphouët-Boigny comment on his lack of outward 
passion and charisma, the first president of Guinea, Sékou Touré, was able to cement his 
popularity through his fiery and eloquent presence in the political field. Out of the three 
political leaders mentioned within this analysis, Touré was the most revolutionary: 
The characteristic which first brought him to prominence and gave him support 
among the people was his courage and readiness to defy the Europeans, whether 
these were French colonialist, American or Russian…. Coupled with his dynamic 
style, his forceful oratory, a skill in organizing urban workers and a reputation for 
personal integrity despite his frequent tactical shifts, these qualities gave him a 
                                                           
18 Cartwright, Political Leadership, 101-102. 
19 Virginia Thompson, “The Ivory Coast,” in African One-Party States, ed. Gwendolyn M. Carter (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1962), 241-2.  
 12 
powerful appeal to Guineans…. Young, handsome and dynamic, Sékou Touré 
was one of the few African nationalist leaders who were genuinely charismatic.20 
Touré was outspoken about the negative effects of colonialism. For him, the biggest evil 
to come out of the colonial regime was the destruction of the basic values of African 
society and the rise of self-interest over solidarity.21 Touré gained prominence as the head 
of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), the Guinean branch of the RDA. His 
beginning in politics was not seamless; his association with the RDA began during the 
years of harassment from the French administration over the party’s affiliation with the 
French Communists. This combined with the limits of political organization in Guinea at 
the time—which was centered on organizing for the purpose of getting elected, but not 
for long-term, ideological objectives like that of Touré’s nationalistic party—meant that 
Touré’s, and the PDG’s, popularity did not develop until into the mid-1950s.22 Several 
factors led to the emergence of Touré as the head political figure within the country. The 
attacks from the French administration on his political party eventually had similar 
effects as that of Côte D’Ivoire, giving the party a stronger image of rebelling against the 
French in the interest of African rights. This, along with victorious labor movements led 
by the politician, including a successful two-month strike to increase the minimum-wage, 
heightened the positive connotation of Touré and the PDG with Guineans.23 As France 
moved into the Fourth Republic, Touré and the PDG had become hugely influential in 
Guinean politics, dominating elections and the political discourse within the country. 
                                                           
20 Cartwright, Political Leadership, 194. 
21L. Gray Cowan, “Guinea,” in African One-Party States, ed. Gwendolyn M. Carter (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1962), 154-155. 
22 Cowan, “Guinea,” 159-160. 
23 Cartwright, Political Leadership, 198. 
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 With the beginning of the leftist regime of Guy Mollet in France, the French 
metropole’s relationship to the overseas territories was again reconsidered. In 1956, the 
loi cadre was developed, a further liberalization of the indigenous political powers of the 
African territories. The law increased the power of the territorial assemblies, which had 
previously been largely advisory, established executive councils in each territory, and 
implemented universal suffrage for Africans.24 This liberalization, while progressive, was 
not revolutionary enough to keep up with the rapid development of the African political 
evolution. By the time the law became effective, the political scene in the territories 
realized the inefficiencies and disadvantages of the law to the further development of 
political autonomy for French Africa.25 In Senegal, these reforms were received with 
hesitancy. The acquisition of a “semiautonomous” status and expansion of powers in the 
colonial administrations were beneficial to Senghor and BDS. Yet, Senghor’s vision for 
the African future was constructed around a strong federation between the various 
territories, and with the loi cadre’s advancement of power at the territorial level, and 
subsequent reduction of power at the federal level, any possibility of building a base for a 
interterritorial government post-independence was destroyed. Senghor went as far as to 
call the law a “regression” for African political development.26  
Guinea, under the more radical leadership of Touré, was stronger in its 
denouncement of the law. In Touré’s own words: 
The loi cadre, by dividing the federations into separately administered territories, 
by refusing even to consider a coordinating government among the territories, 
                                                           
24 Milcent, “Senegal,” 100. 
25 Cowan, “Guinea,” 155. 
26 Milcent, “Senegal,” 100. 
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sowed the seed in Africa of the breakup of the federations. And it was not by 
chance that French West Africa was given eight autonomous governments instead 
of a single one. It was part of a nefarious scheme to continue the metropolitan 
control over underdeveloped but potentially rich territories. It was to perpetuate 
colonialism in a less apparent but nonetheless efficient form, in the final analysis 
to continue the exploitation of the men and riches of Africa, who were to be 
rendered the more vulnerable by this “balkanization.”27 
For Touré, the loi cadre resulted in more French control of the territories, the opposite of 
the liberalizing narrative the French administration was using to promote the law. As 
well, for the Guineans, the law provided proof that Africans were ready to handle their 
own future. If they could be entrusted with these limited powers by the French 
administration, then they were capable of handling enough power to decide the political 
future of their territory.  
 Côte D’Ivoire was isolated in its strong support of the loi cadre. Houphouët, after 
the rehabilitation of his relationship with the French administration, maintained this 
strong relationship through to independence. In fact, Houphouët, after establishing 
enough control over Ivoirian administration, was able to leave the PDCI in control while 
he drafted the loi cadre with the French administration in Paris as a minister-delegate to 
the presidency.28 His contribution to the law reflects his personal views on the future path 
of political development in the colonies. In contrast to Senghor and his dreams of an 
African federation, Houphouët envisioned a Franco-African Republic where each 
                                                           
27 Cowan, “Guinea,” 163-164.  
28 Mundt, “Cote D’Ivoire: Continuity and Change,” 184.  
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component country would have complete internal autonomy while a French led (and 
Parisian-based) federal parliament and federal executive would maintain control of 
monetary policy, defense, and foreign relations. His goal in this was to maintain some 
semblance of French control and contribution to the territories while establishing 
economic independence for Côte D’Ivoire. At the time, the colonial organization of the 
territories was economically disadvantageous for Ivoirians, as the richer territory was 
financially supporting its less prosperous neighbors.29 Thus the “balkanization” of the 
territories, which was inherently undesirable by other African territories, was an 
extremely desirable choice for the Ivoirians.30 With these strong divisions between the 
two powerhouses within the RDA, Houphouët and Touré, RDA membership became 
divided on the future of French-African relations. One camp followed Touré, who 
supported a strong federal structure within Africa itself, with the power to establish 
independence for the colonies and create new relationships with France on a confederal 
basis. Meanwhile, Houphouët’s supporters favored a stronger federal relationship 
between the metropole and the territories, where France would act as a member of the 
group of states, on an equal basis as Africans.31  
 As the Fourth Republic of France deteriorated, which was predominantly brought 
on by the outbreak of a large-scale rebellion in colonial Algeria, the emergence of the 
subsequent Fifth Republic led by General de Gaulle meant that the political relationship 
of France to its territories was again to be reformed. With the introduction of the Fifth 
Republic, the French government held a referendum within the colonies to decide 
                                                           
29 Thompson, “Ivory Coast,” 242. 
30 Cartwright, Political Leadership, 107.  
31 Cowan, “Guinea,” 164.  
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whether or not they wanted to continue their relationship with France into this new epoch 
for the administration. For the colonies, the proposed changes included joining the French 
Community, a new organization for the French presence in their overseas territories.  
Debate quickly broke out among the Africans on the unprecedented choice. Cote 
D’Ivoire under Houphouët was supportive of the Franco-African Community. As with 
the loi cadre, Houphouët had contributed to the process of drafting the new constitution 
and the framework for the Community, thus the changes of the relationship between the 
French to the territories included many aspects desired by Houphouët.32 However, the 
Ivoirian leader failed to understand the political tide in the wider African territories; his 
strong hold and influence in Cote D’Ivoire had lulled him into a false sense of security.33  
Senghor and Lamine Guèye in Senegal were skeptical of the new changes, but 
lacked the complete control over the territory to coordinate a “no” vote. The French were 
able to use their control of the hugely influential Muslim marabouts to push support for 
inclusion within the Community. This left Senghor to promote a lukewarm support of the 
appeal, in which he masterfully utilized double-talk: “Yes to African unity, yes to 
independence, yes to association with France!”34 Senghor, unhappy with the threat of 
retaliation by the French and the lack of discussion over future possibilities at 
independence, was advocating for a “yes” vote with the understanding that the territory 
would soon be making a stronger push for independence, with the hopes that the break 
could be conciliatory.  
                                                           
32 Cartwright, Political Leadership, 108. 
33 Thompson, “Ivory Coast,” 243. 
34 Milcent, “Senegal,” 137.  
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The Guineans under Touré resonated with the Senegalese desire to have a 
concrete assurance of future options for independence, the difference was that the PDG 
had enough power to influence the vote within the territory. Touré remained as opposed 
to the Community as he was to the implementation of the loi cadre. He argued that the 
Franco-African Community offered no genuine independence for its members, and in fact 
reaffirmed many of the weaknesses in the loi cadre rather than attempting to improve the 
weaknesses of the previous law.35 Touré argued for a redrafting of the constitution to 
include provisions that respect the right of Africans to “seek the right to free self-
determination, to administer themselves directly, and to manage their own affairs.” For 
Touré, the most important consideration for the future was the implementation of 
increased sovereignty and enthusiastic consent by all interested parties in current and 
future agreements.36 With these changes, Guinea would vote “yes.” 
 However, de Gaulle was using this referendum to reestablish French control over 
the territory after years under the more lenient Mollet government. Member states had to 
agree to association under French terms or face consequences.37 His response to the 
Guineans demands for modifications was stern, and intended for the wider African 
audience who were on the fence about the Community as much as it was intended for 
Touré: 
France proposes this community; nobody is obliged to join it. You have talked of 
independence. I say here even more loudly than I have elsewhere that 
independence is up to Guinea…. There will, of course, be some consequences for 
                                                           
35 Cowan, “Guinea,” 163. 
36 Cowan, “Guinea,” 166.  
37 Cartwright, Political Leadership, 199.  
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Guinea, but there will be no obstacles in the way. Your country can do what it 
wants the way it wants to and follow any course it likes. If Guinea says “yes”—
that is, if it freely, spontaneously, of its own accord accepts the constitution—and 
if France on its side says “yes,” then the African territories and the Métropole can 
work together for mutual profit.38 
The Guineans were willing to take the risk. With an overwhelming vote of “no” for the 
referendum, they became the only colony to reject the Community and embarked as the 
first French West African independent state established in 1958. 
  Although Guinea was the only territory to voluntarily leave the umbrella of 
French colonization, the Community was not to destined to be a long-lasting, cohesive 
institution. The massive affirmative vote in the referendum by the other territories was 
not tantamount to acceptance of the ideology behind the French Community, nor was it a 
consensus on Houphouët’s ideology present within the text.39 Senghor quickly moved to 
establish the foundations of his long-awaited African federation, recruiting leaders in 
Soudan (modern-day Mali), Upper Volta (modern-day Burkina Faso), and Dahomey 
(modern-day Benin) to work on creating a federational authority within the Community.40  
The French, apprehensive about attempts to consolidate power that competed with their 
authority, subverted the cohesion of this proposed federation. Thus the Mali Federation 
was born with only Soudan and Senegal after the efforts at sabotage by the French were 
successful in poaching Dahomey and Upper Volta away from federation.41 Still, with the 
                                                           
38 Cowan, “Guinea,” 168.  
39 Thompson, “Ivory Coast,” 243.  
40 Milcent, “Senegal,” 104. 
41 Cartwright, Political Leadership, 137-138.  
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creation of the Mali Federation, Senghor, with the combined leadership of Keita in 
Soudan, felt comfortable moving the incorporated territories towards independence. Just 
two years after the creation of the Community in 1960, the Federation made known its 
intent to exercise its right to independence while maintaining its status as a member of 
the Community, which was accepted by the French authorities.42  
Houphouët recognizing that his control over the Community was not as strong as 
he had initially thought, quickly readjusted his policies within the Community. Beginning 
with critiques of the Community not publicly expressed before—commenting on the 
politicization of Community institutions, slowness and insufficiencies of French aid, and 
the retention of French authorities in the territory—Houphouët began developing his plan 
to strike out from the newly founded association.43 His plan developed into the radical 
decision to declare independence while leaving the Community altogether. Houphouët, 
illustrating his mastery of political maneuvering, was able to leave the Community while 
retaining his strong relationship with the French—including French sponsorship of Côte 
D’Ivoire’s statehood at the UN, agreements for international aid, and the increase of 
French subsidies and foreign investment in the newly declared state.44 By the end of 
1960, all of French West Africa had become independent, marking the beginning of 
political development run by the Africans themselves. 
 
 
 
                                                           
42 Milcent, “Senegal,” 105.  
43 Thompson, “Ivory Coast,” 244.  
44 Cartwright, Political Leadership, 108. 
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Chapter 3: Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Political Development 
 
As a newly emerging state, Côte d’Ivoire was the rising star of French West 
Africa. Near the end of the colonial period, Houphouët had successfully transformed his 
strong relationship with the metropole into massive economic benefits, leading the new 
state into a promising future: “To the visitor, the Ivory Coast is plainly the ‘miracle state’ 
of Africa. From the glittering new office towers of Abidjan, to the neatly laid out 
plantations and over-flowing markets of small upper-country towns, there is an air of 
prosperity pervading the country and forming a startling contrast with the run-down 
appearance of, say, Senegal or Ghana.”45 This economic bliss period, with its 
accompanying pacification of strong popular opinions, helped Houphouët quickly 
solidify his power over the territory under the new Constitution. The image of Côte 
d’Ivoire as an economic paradise included certain apathies of the public towards politics. 
While other French West African nations were grappling with a particularly opinionated 
and outspoken citizenry eager to impact its own administration in major ways for the first 
time, Côte d’Ivoire was marked by the absence of political comment from the populace.46 
Most observers argue that Houphouët was able to completely consolidate all 
government responsibilities under himself by 1963.47 The first constitution, which was 
                                                           
45 Ibid., 96.  
46 Ibid., Political Leadership, 96. 
47 Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 185. 
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crafted with the express desire for a strong and stable government, contained a few key 
provisions for the establishment of political institutions in the country. The role of 
president was given a five-year term and elected by universal suffrage.48 The president 
was not only the chief executive but also the head of state. And while he was responsible 
to a national assembly, a vote to overthrow the president also entailed the dissolution of 
the national assembly under that president, limiting the willingness of the assembly to 
take action if it would hurt their positions as well.49 Power under this system rapidly 
came to rest in the hands of a small group of men, with the predominant share of power 
in Houphouët’s own hands.50  
After this initial period of change, the state settled into a comfortable one-party 
regime. Some have categorized the regime as benevolent authoritarianism—democracy à 
l’Ivoirienne—where the president retained all of the power, but still remained attuned to 
his constituents through various processes.51 These processes included his dialogues, a 
series of mass meetings with different sections of Ivoirian society where he could meet 
with locals and listen to their thoughts as he created policy decisions, and the more 
traditional resources of persuasiveness, a firm grip on the party machinery, and the 
wealth of the state.52 The description of Jean-François Médard is particularly apt in 
describing the regime of the economically advantaged Côte d’Ivoire:  
We certainly do not pretend that Côte d’Ivoire is a pluralist, liberal democracy on 
the Western model; moreover, it does not pretend to be that. The absence of 
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judicially protected civil liberties, the state monopoly of the press, the absence of 
institutionalized opposition and, until recently, of free elections, permits us to 
speak of an authoritarian political regime. But that is true of the overwhelming 
majority of political systems present and past. Yet, there are immense differences 
among different authoritarian regimes…. The Ivoirian regimes achieves a strange 
combination of authoritarianism and liberalism, of authority and benevolence, of 
firmness and moderation: in short, it is a paternalistic regime.53 
With the combination of economic prosperity and stable, benevolent rule, many Ivoirians 
had no need to question or seek to change the political situation in their country. 
One of Houphouët’s biggest strengths was his ability to peacefully coopt and 
absorb potential sources of opposition. His publicly expressed opinion towards the 
establishment of an opposition party was that he was not opposed in principle, but it 
needed to develop when it would be constructive, otherwise it was an unnecessary 
luxury.54 Personal diplomacy, wealth, party organization, and the time-honored use of 
political posts and prestige were Houphouët’s preferred method of subduing challengers; 
only when these methods had failed would the PDCI move into harsher approaches 
including jailing, expulsion, and forced retirement. Even after using force, it was a 
temporary measure. Opponents who eventually repented would be given other offers of 
collaboration and absorption into the party fold.55   
This strong emphasis on cooptation led to the PDCI have an extremely wide base 
of support throughout the country as Houphouët and other party members worked to 
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integrate the various ethnic groups and regions into the party’s ideology. The inclusion of 
ethnic integration is key, as it later becomes one of the largest issues in Ivoirian politics, 
yet under Houphouët’s reign it was kept under control through his integration and 
cooptation methods. Article 7 of the constitution was founded during this time, which 
prohibited political parties to organize themselves under ethnic, regional, or religious 
affiliations. Additionally, any citizen born on the Ivoirian territory with one native 
Ivoirian parent had the right to run for presidential office. Ethnic and regional conflicts 
were subdued as Houphouët made sure that wealth was distributed equally throughout the 
territory, implementing state development projects in areas that didn’t receive the 
economic cushion of the cocoa producing regions.  
As the economics of the state weakened towards the end of the 1970s, failings of 
Houphouët’s political system began to surface. The political apathy of the Ivoirian 
populace was heavily based on the economic stability of the state in two main ways. With 
economic prosperity, many Ivoirians adopted a passive acceptance of the regime based 
on the continuity of economic development. Additionally, the PDCI’s control over the 
politics of the territory was based on a patronage system—with political appointments 
and state goods as the product—and without the same levels of state resources the 
patronage system was insufficient to pull in possible opposition. This method of 
cooptation and absorption is sometimes termed “le compromis houphouétiste”: a system 
created by Houphouët-Boigny where, in the absence of democratic channels of 
expression, political demands and political conflicts were kept stable through the use of 
the PDCI’s, and the Ivoirian state’s, economic strength to meet demands, develop 
minority dominated regions, appease political enemies, and keep the public in a state of 
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apathy.56 PDCI’s integration of the diverse elements of Ivoirian society had built little 
sense of nationhood apart from their willingness to cooperation in order to take advantage 
of financial growth.  
With his control and influence waning as a result of the economic recession, 
Houphouët was forced to readjust the political system. In 1980, the first liberalization of 
the Ivoirian political system was approved, with the opening of National Assembly 
elections to competition between nominees for the same position, though still within the 
single PDCI party. While a multiparty system had yet to be installed, voters now had 
choice in their representatives at the local and regional level. The result was stark; there 
was an 82% turnover rate with a strong base of support for newer, young candidates over 
old incumbents. Houphouët strategy had worked perfectly, he had given voters the 
illusion of having voiced their opinions at the ballot, and now had a new cabinet of young 
PDCI representatives who, rather than being a strong voice for the discontent of the 
masses, owed Houphouët for their new positions.57 
A more concrete liberalization came with the 1991 elections, the first multiparty 
elections in the state. Houphouët-Boigny controlled the transition to give the PDCI the 
best advantage against the main opposition party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) 
headed by Laurent Gbagbo. Building upon his coalition-building capabilities fostered in 
the years of single party rule, Houphouët-Boigny assembled various factions of the PDCI 
into a strong coalition of the north, center, and southeast, as well as adopting an simple-
majority electoral system that allowed foreigners to vote. This built a support base for the 
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PDCI that was extremely broad and all-encompassing, while the opposition reactively 
branded itself as a narrowly-focused ethnic party for the Bété people, which resulted in 
an easy victory—86 percent—for Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI.58  
The opening of elections at this point was a smart move by Houphouët-Boigny, as 
the economy worsened, and the patronage system weakened, a transition towards 
democracy was necessary. The choice to open elections himself, rather than calling a 
National conference and a reexamination of the constitution as advocated by Laurent 
Gbagbo, allowed Houphouët-Boigny to control the liberalization to the advantage of the 
PDCI and resulted in a strong PDCI in the multiparty political climate and an isolated and 
divided opposition.59  
However, there were naturally some difficulties in the first national multiparty 
elections. As opposition parties were only newly allowed, the certification process of 
national opposition parties was delayed in the lead-up to the election, meaning that the 
time for new parties to campaign limited. As well, opposition parties faced difficulties 
acquiring permits for headquarters, setting up the infrastructure for campaigning such as 
telephones and printing presses, and establishing support bases to counter the power of 
the long dominant PDCI.60 The results of this liberalization was a further strengthened 
PDCI, the creation of a parliamentary opposition, and a new government post of Prime 
Minister, which Houphouët-Boigny awarded to Alassane Ouattara.61 
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The next national elections held in 1995 presented an entirely different political 
climate. With the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, and a resulting splintering of the 
PDCI between supporters of one successor—Henri Konan Bédié, the president of the 
National Assembly—and Alassane Ouattara—the former prime minister—the PDCI was 
heavily weakened and the political climate took a darker turn. Bédié argued that the 
constitution clearly outlined himself as the rightful heir to the presidency. This was 
officially accurate; Article 11 of the constitution stated that in the event of a presidential 
death, the president of the National Assembly assumes the role of president until 
elections could be called. Ouattara advocated for the appointment of an interim president 
and the immediate planning of new elections. Bédié ultimately won the struggle and 
declared himself president.62 
As the next elections approached in 1994, Bédié as the new head of the PDCI 
faced a much more difficult path to electoral domination when compared to Houphouët-
Boigny’s relatively easy transition. Ouattara, and even Gbagbo and his FPI party, 
provided much more threatening oppositional capabilities than in the previous years.63 
Bédié had also lost the support of the northern section of his coalition, which had allied 
themselves with fellow northerner Ouattara. This tension with the northern coalition was 
anticipated, even without the split between Bédié and Ouattara. Northerners were 
beginning to be dissatisfied with the rewards for their loyalty and had begun demanding 
more high-ranking positions and development programs, especially since northern 
support heavily aided PDCI dominance in the multiparty system.64 
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Whereas Houphouët-Boigny had relied on his broad coalition to result in electoral 
success, Bédié instead switched to a system of narrowing the political power of those 
who would not support the PDCI. Bédié introduced the concept of Ivoirité, that is, the 
idea that only those who had two Ivoirian parents could vote and run for election. This 
move purposefully disenfranchised most northerners from the electoral process, as many 
people who lived there, though they were born in Côte d’Ivoire, had parents who came 
from Burkina Faso, Guinea, or Mali. The influx of immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire had 
historically been encouraged under the Houphouët-Boigny regime, part of the reason that 
he was so popular among that sector of the Ivoirian public, as a means of providing labor 
for expanding markets throughout the country. 
With a formal amendment to the electoral code in 1995, just before the elections, 
Bédié successfully hindered much of the northern coalition from voting and even 
excluded Ouattara from running for president under accusations that he had Burkinabe 
lineage.65  
This election began a tradition of using xenophobic beliefs and the manipulation 
of nationality as a means of exerting control over the political process. Whereas 
Houphouët-Boigny had emphasized coalition building through the distribution of state 
resources to stifle ethnic or regional tensions—which as discussed above included tools 
such as regional development projects and expanded voting rights—Bédié, who lacked 
the economic means of subduing oppositional opinions, used ethnic tension and exclusion 
as a means of guaranteeing his victory in the election. This shift, along with the continued 
economic failures of the state and the instability of opening up elections, caused large 
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public demonstrations over political issues to become increasingly common throughout 
the 1990s. Especially after 1993, public demonstrations, barricades, meetings, and sit ins 
were met with higher resistance from the state, including political assassinations, the use 
of excessive force, and the use of ammunition against protesters.66 This climate of 
violence in the political domain was worsened significantly throughout the period, which 
multiple analysts see as one of the original sources of the brutality of political change 
within the country.67  
 While this method of control was effective in the short term, as Bédié won the 
election after both Gbagbo and Ouattara called for their political support bases to boycott 
elections, his success in politics was soon ended by military coup. In 1999, growing 
political tensions, as well as issues with the army, led to Côte d’Ivoire’s first military 
coup. Headed by General Robert Gueï, the military leader declared that the purpose of the 
coup was to clean up Ivoirian politics and organize new elections.68 Gueï also initially 
announced his plan to transfer power back to a civilian government, but soon decided to 
run for the presidency himself.  
In order to improve his opportunity to move from military to civilian leader of the 
state, he further cemented the legalization of Ivoirité in Ivoirian politics by implementing 
a new constitution that included Article 35, which again stated that a presidential 
candidate must be Ivoirian by birth, must have parents who are both Ivoirian by birth, and 
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must never have acquired another nationality.69 The constitutional change was augmented 
by a controversial Supreme Court decision, which disqualified fourteen of the nineteen 
presidential candidates—including Ouattara on citizenship grounds and Bédié for not 
submitting a proper medical certificate—essentially leaving the presidential race a contest 
between Gbagbo and Gueï only.70 While turnout was only 35 percent, due to election 
boycotts from disenfranchised voters of both the PDCI and RDR parties, Gbagbo won 
with around 60 percent of the vote. While Gueï attempted to disband the National 
Electoral Commission and declare himself the winner, demonstrations from FPI 
supporters and confrontation with the presidential guard forced Gueï to flee and allowed 
Gbagbo to successfully declare himself president.71  
While Gbagbo initially showed signs of attempting a national reconciliation to 
recover from the events of the previous years, chiefly through organizing provincial 
elections and decentralizing state authority, his efforts were not effective after September 
19, 2001, when a group of around eight hundred exiled soldiers called the Patriotic 
Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) launched coordinated attacks on government and 
military facilities in an attempted coup.72 This coup attempt led to a prolonged civil war 
between rebel forces in the north and the government forces in the south. As this section 
examines political developments, and not security concerns, the discussion around the 
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conflict in the upcoming paragraphs will center on the political demands of the rebels and 
the developments of the conflict in the political domain. 
The original intent of the rebel movement was exclusively the removal of Gbagbo 
from presidential office; therefore the original MPCI group relied on a potential quick 
military victory and did not have any plans for what would come after the unseating.73 
Once it became clear that the military standoff would become long and protracted, 
negotiation, especially with international actors, became a chief tactic for the military 
group as it attempted to prepare itself for a long, sustained stalemate. The first set of 
demands from the MPCI were clear: the resignation of Gbagbo; new national elections 
open for all Ivoirians; a review of the constitution, specifically related to citizenship, 
candidate eligibility, and land-ownership; reintegration of rebel forces into the national 
military; amnesty for the rebels; and an opening up of the political sphere to 
northerners.74  
International actors mediating the conflict recognized most of the political 
demands by the rebels as valid, and thus stopped efforts by Gbagbo and the central 
government to solve the conflict through force and annihilation, but the MPCI faced 
heavy difficulty in moving forward their agenda when it came to the resignation of 
Gbagbo from office. Thus French and West African negotiators gave the MPCI leverage 
by justifying the rationalization of their political demands, and by protecting them from 
Gbagbo’s potential military backlash, but stopped short of recognizing the MPCI as a 
                                                           
73 Jennifer Hazen, What Rebels Want (New York: Cornell University Press, 2013) 144. 
74 Jennifer Hazen, What Rebels Want, 144. 
 31 
legitimate political actor that could make political demands, as they were not a political 
organization with a popular mandate.75  
Gbagbo and the central government repeatedly illustrated their reluctance to 
acknowledge the rebels as anything but a military threat; even after the MPCI agreed to a 
cease-fire and attempted to move into the negotiation of a peace deal, Gbagbo failed to 
send representatives multiple times to sign the cease-fire agreement and encouraged 
ECOWAS negotiators to leave the country all while continuing to attack rebel 
strongholds, showing his preference for a military solution.76  
When peace talks were finally initiated, they were unproductive and inefficient. 
Gbagbo, while agreeing to give the rebels amnesty and reintegrate rebel soldiers, 
continued to send low-level delegates with no representative powers to the peace talks 
and refused to consider new elections, which was supported by the ECOWAS mediators. 
These first peace talks ended in failure, as the MPCI withdrew over fears of being 
sidelined from any political considerations and preferred to continue the stalemate until 
the playing field was changed.77 
By 2003, the peace talks had finally produced a peace accord agreed upon by both 
sides. The Linas-Marcoussis Accord (LMA) was drafted in Paris, and included the 
following compromises: the creation of a reconciliation government with full executive 
powers, land reform, the drafting of an electoral timetable culminating in the upcoming 
2005 elections, the revision of presidential eligibility, and the reform of nationality 
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laws.78 While both sides gained necessary concessions, Gbagbo was left unsatisfied by 
weakening of the presidency that would come from giving powers to the reconciliation 
government and to the new Prime Minister, and the Forces Nouvelles, the evolved 
grouping of rebel forces, remained suspicious that these changes would truly force 
Gbagbo to lessen his hold on power.79 While the peace accord had been signed, both 
parties continued to block any successful implementation of the deal itself. Specifically 
for Gbagbo, who, after appointing a new Prime Minister, refused to allow the Forces 
Nouvelles to allocate people to any of the reconciliation posts, halting progress on 
movements past the stalemate that had existed since the initial coup attempt.  
An updated version of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was drafted in early 
2005, reflecting the urgency of development on the peace process as Gbagbo’s 
presidential term came to its end. The Pretoria Accords, like Linas-Marcoussis, attempted 
to touch on all of the issues surrounding the conflict, including the demobilization and 
disarmament of militias, the reinforcement of the Independent Electoral Commission, the 
participation of the United Nations in the electoral process, and by pushing a new session 
of the National Assembly to amend legislation on nationality and identification laws.80 
Yet the continued mistrust of both sides of the reliability of the other, as well as the 
continued preference for potential military action over a negotiated agreement, meant that 
the successful implementation of the Pretoria Accords was also delayed indefinitely. 
With the end of Gbagbo’s presidential mandate in October 2005, the United Nations 
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extended the mandate for another twelve months and called for movement forward on the 
implementation of the accords. 
While the extended mandate only pushed back the expected elections for one 
year, it wasn’t until two years later that a movement forward in the peace process was 
achieved. As both sides faced the reality that the now four-year stalemate was not 
advancing their interests by any means, as well as the growing regional and international 
fatigue and heightened risks of popular revolt as the conflict was further left unsolved, a 
new peace agreement was drafted. President Gbagbo announced in late 2006 his draft of 
a “made in Côte d’Ivoire” plan and an intention to hold direct dialogue with the rebels to 
negotiate an end to the stalemate and the reunification of the country, which would be 
facilitated by Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso and ECOWAS. The Ouagadougou Peace 
Accord, named after the location of its signing, contained many of the previous deals 
from past accords, but also established more concrete steps for the implementation of the 
agreement. It outlined three steps towards resolving the conflict: the issuance of birth 
certificates to those who were born in the country but had never been officially declared 
in the registries and a national campaign of identification to issue identity and voter cards 
to the eligible population; a restructuring of the Ivoirian defense and security forces; and 
the removal of the “zone of confidence” and the French and UN forces monitoring it to 
encourage the reunification of the country.81 With the Ouagadougou Accord, the 
government received the promise of the return of governmental administration to the 
north, including financial administration and taxation, which would undermine the ability 
of the Forces Nouvelles to finance any future elongation of the stalemate. As well, the 
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Forces Nouvelles were granted the right to fill the role of Prime Minister, which ensured 
that they could have more power in the political process as the conflict came to an end. 
 
Security Crises 
 
This section will begin by analyzing some of the issues of military development 
that helped push the initial coup attempt and turned the conflict into the stagnated civil 
war it became. Second, it will analyze how security developments either pushed each side 
to the negotiating table or maintained the conflict even longer. 
The initial coup attempt clearly illustrated the weakness of the governmental 
forces, (FANCI) and the strength of the rebel group (MPCI) in the beginning period of 
the war. Partially due to the element of surprise, the rebels were able to take control of 
multiple important territories within the north in their opening strike without much 
resistance from the Ivoirian military. Ivoirian armed forces appeared unwilling to 
challenge the rebel’s coordinated attacks, and in certain cases FANCI forces, especially 
soldiers who were northerners themselves, defected to the rebels. In the weeks following 
the failed coup, recruitment for the MPCI rapidly increased their numbers to an even 
stronger base. The subsequent period of recruitment increased the MPCI forces to over 
five thousand, while FANCI forces, which had numbered at five thousand before the 
rebellion and the ensuing loss of soldiers, diminished in size.82 This loss of soldiers 
augmented already existing weaknesses of the FANCI defense line; the government 
forces were poorly equipped, had insufficient arms, were not properly trained, and lacked 
                                                           
82 Jennifer Hazen, What Rebels Want, 146. 
 35 
much motivation to fight against the rebels. These weaknesses were intentional. Gbagbo 
had hesitated to fully invest government resources into the state militia over concerns 
about his ability to control them, and had rather invested in the gendarmes, who he 
trusted more.83 
The MPCI, on the other hand, was well prepared for its strike, especially since its 
original intent was to take down Abidjan in order to control the entirety of the state’s 
territory. The main sources of military equipment and soldiers for the MPCI as it 
organized the coup attempt were the Ivoirian military itself and Burkina Faso.84 Military 
exiles from the north had been building up for years, beginning in the years of General 
Gueï’s coup, there had been a systematic purging of the Ivoirian military by targeting 
northerners. This was in coordination with the political disenfranchisement also 
happening in the Gueï years. Two generals who were dismissed in this purge—General 
Palenfo and General Coulibaly—would become important actors in the insurgency 
movement.85  
Gbagbo had continued this exclusion of northerners who had been a part of the 
military in his regime as well; those who were thought to be sympathetic to Gueï or 
Ouattara after the election results were either removed or demoted to make room for 
Gbagbo’s political base.86 Seven to eight hundred soldiers, many of whom were 
scheduled for demobilization by Gbagbo or had faced harassment due to their 
traditionally northern names, participated in the rebellion for the rebels.87  
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These dismissed soldiers constituted a large part of the MPCI’s original 
membership. Their status as ex-Ivoirian military meant that much of the arms and 
ammunition in the early days of the rebellion came from defectors who brought 
equipment with them, or through planned seizures of Ivoirian resources, armed robberies 
of military depots, and the seizure of military equipment when the coup attempt took 
place and territory was seized. After the opening attack, FANCI had an estimated 40 
percent loss of its arms stocks to the rebels.88 
Burkina Faso also provided a strong source of support to the rebels. Exiled 
soldiers from the Ivoirian military used Burkina Faso as a safe haven before their 
attempted coup with support from the Burkinabè president, Blaise Compaoré. Compaoré 
also gave the growing rebel faction arms and training, contributing to their stockpile in 
preparation for the first attack. Compaoré did not attempt to hide his involvement in 
hosting the aspiring insurgency; he had repeatedly warned Gbagbo of the danger of not 
addressing the growing threat or solving the issues causing military exiles to be in 
Burkina Faso in the first place. He even offered to return soldiers, some of whom had 
been tried and convicted in absentia, but only if Gbagbo agreed to give them amnesty and 
reinstate them in the military. After Gbagbo’s refusal, Compaoré continued his support of 
the rebels as they grew into the MPCI.89 
In the early morning of 19 September 2002, the rebels began their mutiny in a 
series of well-coordinated attacks on military installations in the economic capital, 
Abidjan, as well as bigger northern towns, Bouaké and Korhogo. While successful in 
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taking control of these northern hubs, they were unsuccessful in taking Abidjan, and 
retreated to Bouaké, which would become the headquarters of the MPCI, later to become 
the Forces Nouvelles.90 By the end of September, the rebels had a solid hold on all of the 
northern territory. The rebels were unable to take Abidjan not because of the strength of 
government forces, but rather due to the significant presence of French forces in the city, 
which protected both Abidjan and Yamoussoukro, the economic and political capitals of 
the state.91 
While the rebels were advantageous in the beginning stages of the conflict at 
taking northern territory and engaging with governmental forces, as the conflict began to 
move into a longer lasting stalemate the benefit given to the rebels begun to fade. The 
MPCI’s original arrangement was created to provide the best chances at taking territory 
quickly and effectively, which is strategically beneficial for a short-lived coup, but as the 
conflict evolved into a full-fledged rebel movement in a drawn-out standoff, their 
resources, organization, and military strength weakened. This, along with the central 
government’s need to reorganize and replenish after their losses, led to a mutual cease-
fire agreement in mid-October 2002. The cease-fire effectively split the country in half, 
with French, and eventually United Nations, forces patrolling a central “zone of 
confidence,” separating Gbagbo forces in the South from rebel forces in the North.92  
While both sides agreed to the cease-fire, and showed hesitant interest in 
negotiating a peace agreement, it was clear that the two preferred to wait for a military 
solution rather than move forward realistically on a diplomatic one. As discussed in the 
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previous section, throughout the stalemate there were many peace agreements 
negotiated—Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (2003), Kléber Accords (2003), Accra I 
(2002), Accra II (2003), Accra III (2004), Pretoria I (2005), and Pretoria II (2005)—yet 
all of the accords listed were not successful in bringing an end to the impasse.93 
Conditions on the ground did not incentivize political settlements for either side. The 
“zone of confidence,” patrolled by international forces, lowered the risk of attack and the 
cease-fire offered a respite from large-scale battle. Given that the core demands from 
both sides were incompatible at this point, neither the government nor the rebels saw a 
need to focus on the peace talks and rather continued to restructure and strengthen their 
military capabilities as it appeared that the only through conflict would either side 
achieve fully what it wanted.  
While the stalemate persisted through to 2010, there were a variety of situations 
that happened during this time that rapidly changed the equilibrium. One such event was 
the emergence of two new rebel groups in western Côte d’Ivoire towards the end of 2002. 
The Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and the Popular Movement of the Ivoirian 
Great West (MPIGO), appeared similar to the MPCI in intent; both groups claimed the 
dual goals of avenging the former Ivoirian president and General Robert Gueï by 
deposing President Gbagbo. 
While originally focused on stressing their differences from the MPCI, by early 
2003 they had completely matched their political demands to that of the MPCI as well.94 
There were some important distinctions for these two rebel groups, however. Most 
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important were their ties to Liberia and President Taylor. While the MJP was able to 
retain most of its Ivoirian character, it was initially backed by the Liberian president. Its 
overall role was insignificant as it was absorbed into the MPCI by mid 2003.95  The 
MPIGO was more overtly Liberian in character. Most of its forces were Liberian soldiers 
promised free reign of any loot, and the rebel group was openly supported by Taylor as 
an attempt to punish Gbagbo for his own assistance to Liberian rebels. Taylor’s support 
also reflected his wish to help establish a new president that would be friendlier to his 
regime. As well, if the western rebellion were successful, Taylor would be able to divert 
international attention from his own conflicts in Liberia, provide his fighters he could not 
support with loot as a means of payment, and provide a buffer zone to prevent both the 
MPCI and the Ivoirian government forces from getting too close to his border.96 Much 
like the MPJ, the MPIGO was proven ineffectual at keeping territory and was absorbed 
by the MPCI by the end of 2003. 
While ineffectual at lasting in the conflict long-term, the two new rebel groups 
complicated the situation. The Ivoirian government had to face three fronts, rather than 
just one, and had illustrated its preference to negotiate with MPCI forces rather than the 
pro-Liberian western rebels.97 Perhaps the most important consequence of the 
introduction of the new groups was the result of their absorption by the MPCI. After the 
folding in of new elements, the MPCI renamed itself Forces Nouvelles, and was forced to 
restructure its organization as well. The difficulties of introducing the MPJ and the 
MPIGO caused the Forces Nouvelles to establish an administrative system, create a more 
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united front against government forces, and implement La Centrale—a centralized 
financial and taxation system for the northern region.98 La Centrale developed into a quite 
stable and lucrative income-generating mechanism for the Forces Nouvelles, which 
allowed them to strengthen their position in the stalemate as they had a ensured ability to 
continue financing their presence in the conflict, something sorely lacking after their 
initial coup attempt.  
With the arrival of the Ouagadougou Peace Accords, the inefficiencies of 
previous peace negotiations were finally overcome and the stalemate was broken. While 
the political concerns addressed in the Ouagadougou Peace Accords are already 
discussed above, one of the most important changes militarily in this negotiation from 
previous ones is the dismantling of the zone of confidence. The agreement stipulated the 
use of joint brigades from both sides to replace the UN and French Security forces, and 
the replacement of the zone with a “green line” dotted with observation points.99 Given 
that the zone of confidence had previously been utilized more as an assurance to both 
sides that they were protected in the short-term from the other, the actual undoing of the 
blockade encouraged both sides that peace was forthcoming, as they were now both at a 
higher risk of attack as the defensive barrier was taken down; it was a purposeful 
illustration of both side’s willingness to become more vulnerable as a sign of good faith.  
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Analysis 
 
 The Ivoirian conflict presents many potential aspects of the relationship between 
politics and security crises to explore. Within this analysis I will focus on three specific 
aspects of the conflict which illustrate an intriguing link between the two concepts. The 
first will be the Bédié’s use of Ivoirité, followed by Gueï and Gbagbo, to exclude the 
north from the political process in order to strengthen their potential holds on power, and 
how this political exclusion was mirrored by exclusion in the military forces. The second 
aspect will be the stalemate of the conflict, and how the reaction of the international 
community to the political demands of the rebels, and the natural incongruency of these 
political demands with Gbagbo’s presidency, affected the peace process. The last link to 
be discussed will be the use of the elections of 2010, and the necessary acceptance of 
both sides of the results of these elections, as a means of finalizing the end of the conflict.  
 One of Houphouët-Boigny’s biggest strengths throughout his presidency was his 
use of a patronage system to maintain both a solid hold on all levers of power and ensure 
the continued peace and stability of the nation’s population in order to implement his 
most valued goal for the Ivoirian state—economic growth. However, with the economic 
recessions of the later years of his presidency, his ability to use a patronage system to 
guarantee both his hold on power and the stability of the populace wavered. While he was 
able to successfully maneuver the system to continue the dominance of the PDCI up until 
his death, his successor, Bédié, was not as apt at the political game as his mentor.  
Bédié was the first to resort to political exclusion to strengthen his position. The 
exclusion of those who had parents born outside Côte d’Ivoire from any electoral process, 
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including voting and running for election, was a targeted attack on the political 
expression of the northern half of the country. Many northerners were children of 
immigrants from other countries, predominantly Burkina Faso, Guinea, or Mali, who 
Houphouët-Boigny had supported in coming to Cote d’Ivoire as a provision of cheap 
labor to help expand the economy.100 With their exclusion, Bédié had a much easier time 
winning the election, as his biggest opposition, Ouattara, and Ouattara’s main political 
base were excluded from the vote.  While both methods of controlling power were 
undemocratic attempts to strengthen their personal hold on the levers of power, under 
Houphouët’s system his manipulations strengthened the appearance of internal stability 
while Bédié’s relied on increasing internal instability.  
Gueï only further codified this exclusion by adding it to the constitution, and 
Gbagbo was willing to use it to his advantage in the election of 2000. Every potential 
presidential candidate, except Ouattara as a northerner himself, was willing to invoke 
Ivoirité if it meant the presidential seat. While Gbagbo originally opposed the change and 
boycotted elections in 1995, he refused to change the system of Ivoirité when it gave him 
an advantage in the presidential race of 2000. Similarly, while Bédié was the first to 
introduce Ivoirité into Ivoirian politics in 1994, in the post-coup elections it was himself, 
along with Ouattara, who boycotted the election in response to Gueï’s 
constitutionalization of the concept.  
What is intriguing about the political exclusion was the correlation with military 
exclusion. Throughout the Bédié years, military personnel were discriminated against if 
                                                           
100 United States Institute of Peace, Creating a More Inclusive Peace in Côte d’Ivoire, by Kelly Campbell 
and Adams Fusheini, (Washington D.C., 2006), 1. 
 43 
they had stereotypically northern names. This makes logical sense for Bédié and his 
party; the military is one of the biggest threats to the central regime, and if that military is 
staffed with people you are excluding from the political process, the risk of those 
personnel in wanting to overthrow the government only increases. In order to react to the 
potential danger of disgruntled military members, it is logical to take away their ability to 
access the country’s weapons and sources of military power. Gueï continued this military 
exclusion as well, purging the army of northerners after his coup, including the exile of 
military leaders who were to become MPCI leaders after they fled to Burkina Faso. 
Gbagbo, after gaining power, also continued this process. Seven to eight hundred of the 
soldiers in the initial MPCI uprising were soldiers who had been scheduled for 
demobilization by Gbagbo, and the new president had also taken resources from Ivoirian 
military forces, which he did not fully trust, and place them in his local gendarmerie and 
presidential guard. 
While the logic is clear for the military exclusion of those the government was 
repressing, the very exclusion itself helped to develop the rebel movement into the force 
that was able to take and occupy the northern half of the country for eight years. As we 
have already discussed, the first years of the MPCI’s existence was supported by 
dismissed service members and the weapons that they had gained during their time in the 
FANCI forces. Their dismissal from the army, an attempt to decrease their threat to the 
central government, only gave them more motivation to become the MPCI itself.  
 Another aspect of the security/politics links within the Côte d’Ivoire case study to 
be analyzed is the treatment of the political demands of the rebels, especially in the 
opening stages of the conflict. The MPCI’s core demands included Gbagbo’s resignation, 
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new national elections open to all Ivoirians, a review of the constitution, the reintegration 
of rebel forces into the national military, amnesty for the rebels, and the opening up of the 
political sphere to northerners.101 These demands address the two major concerns of the 
rebel forces: their political and military exclusion. Successful reintegration in these two 
domains was their chief goal. Yet, international actors who were mediating the conflict 
refused to give the MPCI recognition as a political entity that could make political 
demands; as a military group only military demands could be made. International actors 
also inhibited the MPCI from asking for any political changes in the initial negotiations, 
which delayed any possibility of the peace process to create an effective peace accord, as 
the core of the conflict was the incongruency of the political demands of either side, not 
the military issues which were a reaction to the political exclusion. Attempts by the 
MPCI to create a political network in Europe, Mali, and Burkina also failed.  
Furthermore, while the international community was objecting to the ability of the 
MPCI to make political demands, they did recognize the legitimacy of the demands 
themselves, which hindered Gbagbo’s ability to react to the rebels. Gbagbo was not 
allowed to use military force to end the rebellion even after he recuperated from the 
damage of the initial attacks. With the inability of the MPCI to change the conflict 
through neither attacks nor political demands, and the inability of the presidential forces 
to use violence and Gbagbo’s refusal to accept any political demands from the MPCI, the 
conflict naturally settled into the long stalemate that it became.  
 The last aspect of the security-political relationship in the Côte d’Ivoire case to be 
discussed is the use of the elections of 2010 as a means of finalizing the end of the 
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conflict. With over six negotiated peace agreements signed throughout the conflict, the 
arrival of the Ouagadougou Accord, and its four supplemental agreements, were not 
guarantors of a finite ending to the conflict. Two aspects of the agreement made it strong 
enough to survive the implementation period. The first has been discussed in the security 
section: the dismantling of the zone of confidence. With the continuation of the zone, 
both sides were supporting the potential of future conflict, necessitating the maintenance 
of the buffer between the zones to protect from possible attacks. With its dismantling, 
along with the concrete developments in the reintegration of the rebels within the armed 
forces, allowed for the security aspect of the conflict to make meaningful development of 
de-escalation.  
The second factor within this de-escalation is a significant progression on the 
political stalemate between the two entities, which was one of the biggest factors 
inhibiting the implementation of peace. The Forces Nouvelles needed an assurance that 
the political processes within the country would develop into a lasting system that would 
not again move towards exclusion for northern voters. As well, given the illegitimacy of 
the elections that had placed Gbagbo in power, the rebels required an legitimate election 
in order to restore a sense of validity to the central government and the presidential 
office. Gbagbo main interest was his hold on power, and while the Ouagadougou Accord 
put him at risk of losing the presidency, he was confident in his ability to win another 
election, or at least manipulate the climate into an election that he could win. With the 
arrival of elections in 2010, the peace process was thrown into uncertainty; if either side 
refused to accept the outcome, then any lasting movement towards peace would not be 
made. Gbagbo’s failure to delay the elections of 2010, along with his failure to rig them 
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for his victory, was the necessary catalyst to end the conflict.102 Even as Gbagbo refused 
to step down after the legitimate elections took place and Ouattara was declared the 
winner, his position gave the international community, the rebels, and the police forces 
the unity they needed to work together to arrest the former president and place Ouattara 
as a leader that both the central government and the rebel forces could unite behind. 
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Chapter 4: Guinea 
 
Political Development 
 
As Guinea became a new state, it faced many challenges due to its antagonistic 
break with France. While de Gaulle had confirmed that any country who voted against 
the Fifth Republic was free to opt out, the slighted French government and French 
administrators engaged in punitive actions as a result of the “no” vote. French 
administrators and technicians were given a period of ten months to transition out of the 
country, with instructions to train their Guinean replacements, yet the majority of the 
administration left as quickly as they could, even going so far as to destroy telephone 
instruments and plumbing facilities, and destroying or taking vital files and paperwork 
with them as they left.103 Fortunately, due to its strength during the colonial period, the 
PDG was a well-organized and disciplined party whose members were capable of taking 
over a good number of the important functions of government—including tax collection 
and maintenance of order.104   
Another key advantage for the blossoming Touré regime was the strong internal 
political unity achieved during independence. In order to vote “no” in the referendum, the 
party had been obligated to ensure that the public voted nearly unanimously against the 
French. With independence achieved, the public was ready to work in unity to start 
building up the new country as had been promised in the lead-up to the referendum 
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vote.105 Through his own popularity within the country, and due to the short period of 
harmony gifted as part of the referendum vote, Touré was able to establish a regime that 
wasn’t simply a government with a single party, it was a political system where the 
political party was the government. Touré himself described the role of the PDG as the 
only necessary political institution in the government: “The PDG has not hesitated to say 
that more than ever it will retain its supremacy over all other institutions in the country. 
Only through the party can we… raise ourselves to the level of great responsibilities.” 
Touré went even further by declaring “The party, then, is the supreme organ, occupying a 
role that is higher than the government itself. Within its hands are concentrated political, 
technical, economic, and judicial powers…. The Guinean regime is not a single-party 
system; the regime is itself the party and no distinction can be made between the two.”106 
At this point in the state’s political structure, all other organs of government are 
subordinate to the PDG. The tasks of the cabinet and the legislature are to apply the 
decisions of the party, the only power they have is to figure out the details and execution 
of policy already created through the party congress.107 
While the country had adopted a Western-style constitution shortly after 
independence, which implemented a system of checks and balances including the sharing 
of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, Touré quickly 
implemented the norm of party superiority over the branches of government and ultimate 
supremacy of the PDG over all aspects of political and civic life.108 According to him, the 
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separation of powers “has no other result than to dispossess the people of its prerogatives 
by making superior to its interests, either those of the state, of the army, of justice or, in 
parliamentary democracy, of the parliament.”109 Even political influences that were 
outside of direct government control–such as youth, worker’s and women’s 
organizations—were placed under control of the PDG, with a single party-supported and 
controlled body for each organization type, and even mandatory participation in certain 
instances, such as the PDG youth organization.110 The Touré regime implemented many 
rule changes that increased its control over civic life and civil society. These changes 
included the abolition of private schools, subordination of religious leaders to the party-
state, elimination of independent press, party control of all cultural and sports activities, 
socialization of the economy, establishment of state farms and cooperatives, elimination 
of liberal professions, and the monopolization of all intellectual life by PDG ideology.111 
Touré had various descriptions of his regime type. While not reluctant to use the 
term “dictatorship,” he differentiated between democratic and undemocratic 
dictatorships. In his view, the PDG, while having complete control over the political, 
economic, and technical development of the state, represented the will of the people. 
According to Touré’s definition, as long as PDG leadership truly embodies the wills of 
the people, all of the leadership’s decisions are democratic. Touré argued that the 
fundamental principle upon which the party is organized is democratic centralism: “from 
top to bottom and bottom to top all decisions of whatever nature take into account the 
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will of the majority of members.”112 This idea of democratic centralism also entails the 
election of leadership at all levels of party organization, mandated reports by all party 
organs to the electors, and the obligatory acceptance of all decisions of higher party 
organs lower in the hierarchy. While the party created methods of solving intraparty 
disagreements or criticisms and established dialogues between the lower echelons and 
elite members of the party, resolutions laid down by the party leadership must be 
executed fully, even if lower members did not approve.113 
With complete control over all political life, the PDG established four main 
objectives: to maintain Sékou Touré in power; to establish control of the PDG under 
Touré’s direction over all facets of Guinean life; to enable the Guineans to determine 
their own pattern of economic and cultural expression; and to develop the economy.114 
Touré had a Fanon-esque vision for Guinean society, with a complete psychological 
reconversion of the people that completely removed all of the colonial economic 
structures designed to benefit only the Europeans. For Touré, this vision could only be 
achieved with national unity and the full support of the masses, which led him to continue 
to consolidate power. Only the total mobilization of the energies of the people under the 
direction and guidance of the party could lead to his ideal liberalization of society.115  
The realization of the goals of Touré’s regime and the PDG quickly fell short of 
anticipations. With control entirely in the hands of the PDG, meaning that control was 
entirely in the hands of Touré himself, the capacity of a small number of people in 
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obstructing the nation’s political, economic, and social development became clear. 
National unity was hindered by the compulsory nature of party membership and the 
party-controlled aspects of daily life. As well, the attempts of equality and fairness within 
the party structures were undermined by the development of a party elite, which had a 
much higher standard of living and social status than regular citizens.116 This elite, 
representing the party leadership, was corrupted by the promotion of political appointees 
based on Touré’s impression of a candidate’s political fervor and opportunism, rather 
than qualifications and skill.117 Furthermore, the original “democratic centralism” aspects 
of the PDG rule diminished over time, with the internal debates and discussions over 
policy issues found within the early 1960s falling out of practice as power became 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of Touré.118 
As the country entered into the late 1960s, the Touré regime became increasingly 
suspicious and repressive. Various real and alleged plots to overthrow the regime towards 
the end of the 1960s, and an unsuccessful invasion from Portuguese Guinea in 1970 led 
Touré, who had now centralized power almost entirely in his hands, to become 
increasingly paranoid, and heightened his need to have complete control over the 
population.119 Power was further centralized under Touré and his most trusted associates, 
which led to more corruption as family members and other associates took advantage of 
the shift of the power of PDG from mass party to a small circle of political elites.120 The 
                                                           
116 ‘Ladipo Adamolekun, Sékou Touré’s Guinea, 25-26. 
117 Aguibou Yansané, “Guinea: The significance of the coup of April 1984 and economic issues,” World 
Development 18 (September 1990): 1233. 
118 U.S. Agency for International Development, Democratic Governance in Guinea, 21. 
119 Ibid.,, 20. 
120 Yansané, “Guinea: the significance of the coup of April 1984,” 1233.  
 52 
dictatorship became increasingly brutal, with some sources estimating that tens of 
thousands of Guineans were victims of political violence, thousands were jailed for 
oppositional beliefs, and over one million citizens fled the country, becoming exiles.121 
The repression and brutality of the Touré regime in the later years was only ended with 
his death in 1984 at the age of 62.122 
 With the instability that came with the death of Touré, military forces were able to 
successfully stage a coup and take power away from the PDG. Less than a month after 
Touré’s death, a radio statement declared that the Guinean armed forces had taken power, 
suspended the constitution, and had dissolved both the PDG and the National 
Assembly.123 The coup was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Lansana Conté, who became 
the head of state and chairman of the Military Committee for National Redress (CMRN), 
which became the new governing entity. The CMRN, who framed the takeover as a 
means of resolving the brutality and injustice of the Touré regime, which they cited as 
“brutal and callously inhuman,” 124 declared that they would move towards democratic 
reform, and argued that the undemocratic coup would soon transition to a civilian 
regime.125 The new regime was successful in eliminating many of the worst abuses of the 
Touré regime—freeing political prisoners, closing down the infamous Boiro 
concentration camp, restoring civil liberties—and liberalizing the economy in its initial 
years.126  
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 However, Conté soon argued against an early return to civilian rule, asserting that 
a deliberate approach to reforms would be more beneficial to the country.127 Between 
1984 and 1990, the CMRN remained the sole governing institution, during which there 
were no national or municipal elections, no political parties, no constitution, and no 
separated governing bodies. The CMRN, with Conté as its leader, consolidated power 
over the government and the military.128  
 In 1990, a federal constitution was finally created. The new constitution 
established a strong executive branch, allocating presidential powers that included 
determining and managing national policy, ensuring the execution of the law, naming 
ministers and all civilian employees, leading the military, and extensive pardoning 
power.129 Furthermore, the constitution stipulated that the president would lead the 
provisional legislative body until an election for the National Assembly was held, 
elections which were delayed by Conté who could use his delegated powers to postpone 
elections during a transitional period.130 The first national elections were held in 1993 for 
the presidency, which Conté was easily able to win amidst wide criticisms of possible 
fraud.131 The 1993 election served as a means for which Conté could finally assert his 
legitimacy as a democratically elected national leader, rather than a leader resulting from 
the coup of 1984. He was again elected in 1998 and 2003, with his margin of victory 
increasing with each election. 
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 Even while he continued to use undemocratic means to ensure his uncontested 
hold on power, there were democratic evolutions within the years of Conté’s regime. The 
1990 constitution established provisions protecting the civil liberties and political rights 
of Guinean citizens, protected freedom of speech, religion, property rights, and religion, 
and prohibited discrimination based on race, gender, or religion. As well, the constitution 
provided safeguards against abuses of state forces and military on citizens.132 Throughout 
the Conté years, Guinean civil society began to develop with the emergence of political 
parties, human rights associations, a free and independent press, and the proliferation of 
NGOs.133 The free press in particular flourished in this time, as well as free speech for the 
opposition to speak out against the ruling administration, though this was lessened in the 
later years of the regime as Conté began to jail strong opponents and parties.134 135 
 The end of the Conté regime came with his death in December of 2008. With the 
death of Conté, Guinea went through a similar process as with Touré’s death, with 
military captain Moussa Dadis Camara announcing hours after the dictator’s death that he 
had seized control of the capital through military coup. Left, again, with the uncertainty 
of succession, a military coup was a means of maintaining stability as Camara attempted 
to fill the power vacuum left behind with the death of President Conté. Ambitious and 
charismatic, he initially promised public reform and free and fair elections within two 
years as a means of building legitimacy. Camara also promised that he nor any member 
of his military coup would run for office.136 Tensions were heightened as the possibility 
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of Camara running became stronger in the preparatory period for the transition into 
civilian government. Responding to the tension, Camara asserted that “Any political 
leader who makes trouble by organizing strikes of protests or any other forms of mass 
mobilization will simply be removed from the list of candidates and will also be 
prosecuted.”137 The public continued to resist, forming a 50,000-person rally to speak out 
against the possibility of Camara running for office. The event turned deadly as forces 
from the Presidential Guard fired directly into the stadium crown, and hunted down those 
who ran into the streets.   
 The brutality of the attack ended Camara’s political aspirations, as he was shot by 
an associate next month. By February 2010, the military junta formerly led by Camara 
announced its decision to hand over power to a provisional government, which would 
hold elections later in the year. General Konaté, who took over Camara’s role as head of 
the military leadership, also declared the appointment of Jean-Marie Doré, an opposition 
leader, as prime minister of the provincial government, significantly decreasing the 
power of the military in establishing the new governmental system.138 Elections were 
held later in the year, and Guinea’s next president became Alpha Condé. 
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Security Crises 
 
As discussed in the previous section, Touré’s initial philosophy towards 
governance was his self-titled “democratic” dictatorship, where the party had complete 
control over all aspects of government and civil life, but worked to implement the will of 
the people. For Touré’s initial goals for Guinean society—a deconstruction of colonial 
institutions and restructuring of a new, completely independent and fulfilling social 
structure—absolute control was a necessity. However, for a variety of reasons, once 
complete centralization was achieved, Touré would quickly ignore the revolutionary 
foundations of his independence movement in order to instead foster a brutal, 
undemocratic dictatorship that would inflict much harm on Guinean society. Touré’s 
regime itself became the main security threat to Guinean citizens in the initial decades of 
the country’s existence. 
 His shift from charismatic independence leader to oppressive ruler is complex, 
but many authors believe that his brutality correlated with his paranoia of losing power. 
A series of events that came after the initial years of post-independence control proved to 
Touré that his regime was not invincible. A 1970 invasion by Guinean exiles, with 
support from the Portuguese navy and neighboring Guinea-Bissau, though unsuccessful, 
pushed the president’s paranoia into a new domain. After the invasion, there were mass 
arrests and public hangings for those who Touré viewed as potential opponents, even 
those within the PDG. The paranoia became worse as the years progressed, especially 
after other leaders within the independence and nationalist movements in the region were 
toppled, such as through the coups overthrowing Nkrumah and Keïta in Ghana and Mali.  
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As his hold on power became more tenuous, Touré’s obsession with using any 
means to remain in power only worsened.139 The increasing hostility and vindictiveness 
of the Touré regime led to a mass migration of Guinean citizens to neighboring countries. 
Between 1 and 2 million Guineans fled from the country during this period. His paranoia 
also led him to shut down any potential sources of challenge to his hold on power. He 
readily arrested or killed alleged enemies, jailing tens of thousands of citizens in the 
infamous Boiro Camp prison, where many did not survive.140 By 1977, only a small 
number of Touré’s close political associates remained. Out of the 71 initial ministers and 
secretaries of state that he had appointed, nine had been shot or hanged, eight had died 
while in detention, eighteen were serving a life sentence for hard labor, twenty-one had 
served prison terms but had been freed, five had escaped abroad, and only eleven avoided 
any kind of punishment.141 
With Touré’s increased spiral into paranoia, the political development of the 
country further stagnated. The regime demanded total loyalty, encouraged spying, 
denounced anti-revolutionary or contradictory opinions, and was naturally suspicious of 
university graduates and intellectuals who had studied abroad.142 Fear of retribution 
stifled any potential for oppositional opinions, free press, civil society, or any kind of 
contribution to the governance process by those who were not Touré or Touré’s closest 
and most trusted associates. Touré also lost any hope for his initial dreams of a new 
future for Guinean society, as the climate of the country towards the end of his regime 
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was that of “sullen indifference” for his revolution; apathy increased as citizens lived in 
fear, watching the disappearance of many, the growth of corruption, and the loss of any 
kind of mass support that was necessary for the changes Touré had initially promised.143 
With the death of Sékou Touré in 1984, the future of the country became quite 
unstable, becoming a security crisis. Warnings were delivered about the potentiality of 
ethnic violence among the three main ethnic groups, as well as the risk inherent in the 
uncertainty of who was going to assume power and what the change would mean for the 
future of Guinean politics.144 Soon after Touré’s death, the uncertainty was resolved as a 
bloodless military coup took place. The unresolved issue of succession gave the military 
the opportunity to enact a significant regime change on the grounds of seeking to avoid 
civil war.145 Guinea’s armed forces announced by radio their ascension to power, 
declaring the suspension of the constitution, the country’s political party, and the 
National Assembly.146 The coup was enthusiastically accepted by the Guinean people.  
The first challenge of the Conté regime was transitioning from military rule to a 
democratically elected government. Yet, the first elections were not held until 1990, six 
years after the death of Touré, and elections for the presidency were further delayed until 
1993, where Conté became a democratically elected leader and president of the nation. 
Conté’s regime was marked by an interesting relationship between the military 
and the central government. In the beginning years of the regime, the military was seen as 
a beneficial presence in society, as it was the force that had liberated people from the 
                                                           
143 Cartwright, Political Leadership in Africa, 208. 
144 U.S. Agency for International Development, Guinea: Potential Sources of Conflict and Instability. PN-
ACN-619 (Washington, DC, 1998), 6, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacn619.pdf 
145 U.S. Agency for International Development, Democratic Governance in Guinea, 23. 
146 Yansané, “Guinea: the significance of the coup of April 1984,” 1231.  
 59 
oppressive Touré regime. And the military, supervised by Conté, took steps to liberalize 
the country in response. Political prisoners were freed, the Boiro concentration camp was 
closed down, and basic civil liberties were restored.147 A USAID report succinctly 
summarizes the view of the military by the public at this stage: 
First, the military carried out the coup that brought down the old regime. Second, 
the military claims that it was the force which brought democracy to Guinea. 
Third, it claims to be the guarantor of political stability and national unity. Fourth, 
the military receives many national honors. A special day was set aside to 
celebrate the 36th anniversary of the army. President Conté owes his position as 
national leader to the military which chose him to lead the country after the coup 
and which agreed to gradually power to a civilian regime. As an interest group, 
the military has traditionally been well taken care of in terms of national 
budgetary allocations.148 
The military was seen as the savior of stability and peace. However, there was also an 
ingrained fear of authority, as evidenced through interviews of Guinean citizens, who 
cited a fear of the authorities and crossing government officials and their collaborators as 
a big motivation for their interactions with any authority—whether it be military, 
governmental, or other.149  
Another key insight into the civilian-military relationship found within Guinea 
during these years is found when analyzing the security situation surrounding the 
country. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, all neighbors of Guinea, were all 
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undergoing violent, anarchic conflicts during this time. Interviews with Guinean citizens 
in the late 1990’s indicates that the people of Guinea strongly preferred to maintain a 
peaceful and stable environment even if that meant development objectives were pursued 
at a slower pace.150 The presence of war-torn refugees, with Guinea having more refugees 
than any other African country in the mid to late 1990’s further cemented the necessity 
for Guineans to continue pushing for stability and peace, as Guineans knew there was no 
easy path out of the country if flight were to become necessary.151  
As well, the Guinean military provided a substantial number of troops to assist in 
quelling the violence occurring just past the borders—an estimated 50 percent of 
Guinea’s army during this time period was occupied with either maintaining the security 
of the borders or assigned to the ECOMOG mission operating in Sierra Leone.152 The 
importance of the military in protecting the country from the chaos abroad, as well as its 
necessity in maintaining stability internally, naturally led to widely supported policies 
that continued to keep the military happy—including large budget allocations, 
celebrations, and more leeway in their interactions with other members of society. 
Yet, by leaving military power unchecked, it often served as a force of injustice in 
Guinean society. Oversight of military forces became a key issue of the Conté regime. As 
a former general throughout the Touré regime, Conté remained the only active general 
and, as president, determined all of the nation’s military policy. Nothing concerning the 
military, or the military budget, would be delegated to the National Assembly.153 
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Furthermore, the public, conveyed frustration over continued corruption of police and 
military forces, especially in terms of arbitrary detention and torture, unexplained 
disappearances, bribery, and collaboration with bandits.154  
While the 1993 elections formally switched the Conté regime from military 
leadership to a democratically elected governance, the use of undemocratic processes to 
limit the feasibility of opposition influencing governmental activities leaves the Conté 
regime as a long-standing, military backed authoritarian regime, albeit less oppressive 
than his predecessor, but still lacking in many opportunities for liberalization.155 
The death of Conté brought another crisis extremely similar to that of Touré’s 
death. An unclear line of succession meant the Guinea was thrown into uncertainty, 
especially since it was clear that the potential future president could amass most power 
for himself, using the last two long-lasting regimes as an example. A few hours after the 
death of Conté, a group of army officers, led by Captain Camara, took power in another 
bloodless coup, much like the one that brought the Conté regime to power. Once again, 
Guineans welcomed the arrival of the new source of power and were hopeful about future 
opportunities for growth. Camara, again much like Conté, suspended the Constitution and 
governmental institutions. He also took it a step further by promising free and transparent 
elections in the next year with a guarantee that the country’s candidates for that election 
would not come from the military coup members.156 It initially appeared that Camara was 
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using the security crisis stemming from the lack of successor to take power and advance 
necessary democratic reforms.  
However, a crisis soon returned as Camara began to exhibit clues that he would 
be running in the next election cycle, leading to unrest among the civilian population. 
This dissatisfaction led the planning of major demonstration in Conakry Stadium on the 
28th of September in 2009 to oppose the possibility of Camara running for office, and 
soon became the scene of a massacre. On the eve of the demonstration, the Minister of 
the Interior announced that all future demonstrations would be banned, with no reason 
given for the decision.157  
The resulting reaction from Guinean security forces as the 50,000-member rally 
continued as planned was brutal. Witnesses first describe police officers blocking entries 
and exits to and from the stadium, followed by the launching of tear gas grenades and 
guns fired into the air.158  Soon after, guns were fired directly into the stadium, people 
were bayonetted as they attempted to flee, and many women were raped, both in the 
street or whilst kidnapped houses. In only a few hours, more than 150 people were killed 
by ammunition or bladed weapons, over 40 women were raped in public or in private 
houses, more than 1500 people were wounded, with many others missing. Additionally, 
many demonstrators were arrested and arbitrarily detained, many of them undergoing 
torture. Witnesses recounted seeing attackers wearing the “red berets” of the Presidential 
Guard, as well as other militiamen in civilian clothing committing other acts of violence. 
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159 Witness statements provide a disturbing illustration of the violence and chaos of the 
events: 
We were surprised to see the ‘red berets’ appear in closed ranks. They opened fire 
on the crowd in every direction. It was like a war film; I have never seen anything 
like it in all my life. Someone told me to hide and so I hid underneath the seats. I 
heard bullets whistling by.160 
 
Blue shirted soldiers [belonging to the gendarmerie] threw tear gas grenades into 
the crowd. Immediately afterwards, the ‘red berets’ opened fire on the crowd and 
people fell to the ground. People trampled the dead bodies underfoot in order to 
escape. As I was running, there was a boy in front of me who had been stabbed in 
the neck with a dagger. The blood spurted out, it was like seeing a cockerel that 
has had its throat cut, running loose. The boy, who was wearing a white shirt, was 
screaming as he lay on the ground with his arms and legs convulsing. Meanwhile, 
the ‘red berets’ fired into the crowd, aiming at the head and chest. I heard one of 
the ‘red berets’ say: ‘Open the gate, let’s get the bastards out of here’. People 
rushed towards the gate but a ‘red beret’ grabbed a girl who was running away 
and knocked her over, she struggled while he tried to undress her. Two other ‘red 
berets’ came to help him, held her down and hit her with their black truncheons. 
Another one undressed and raped her.161 
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The disastrous events of September 28th led to an end of the potential Camara 
regime. While it is clear the military leader was attempting to continue the trend, begun 
by Conté, of establishing a long-reigning, undemocratically uncontested presidency after 
a bloodless coup, the events at Conakry Stadium ended any possibility for that future. 
With heavy international outrage and pressure, fractures within the military leadership 
worsened. In December, Lieutenant Abubakar Toumba Diakité, attempted to assassinate 
Camara by shooting him point blank in the head. Evidence supports the theory that 
Diakité tried to kill Camara due to fears that the blame for the massacre would be put on 
him.162 Regardless of the intent, the result of the attempted assassination was the closure 
of Camara’s involvement in Guinean politics, as he was moved to Morocco for treatment 
and did not return back to the country afterwards. 
The events of September 28th highlight a continuance of the issues of civil-
military relations found throughout the Conté regime. The line between military/special 
operations forces and local policing has been blurred throughout the years within 
Guinean society, with the repeated deployment of military units alongside police and 
gendarmerie against peaceful, unarmed citizens, resulting in most cases in unlawful 
killings, excessive force, and arbitrary detainment.163 Evidence collected after the attack 
indicate that in the months after the death of Conté, recruitment policies for the 
gendarmerie were lightened, and in order to rapidly expand the available gendarmerie 
forces entrance tests were disposed of and training was lessened in order to more quickly 
deliver more forces.164 The military followed suit, with Camara and the CNDD 
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reintegrating soldiers “under observation,” as well as previous soldiers who had been 
dismissed for “alcoholism, desertion, banditry, drugs and undesirability.”165 While these 
decisions were made at the beginning of the Camara coup, they were certainly present 
during Conté regime as well. Government officials have acknowledged that under 
Lansana Conté “the rules governing recruitment into the armed forces were not 
respected,” and that “the decision-making process is corrupted.”166 This emphasis on 
rapid, irregular recruitment with inadequate training and no detailed regulations of 
security forces, especially in a society that puts them in high esteem, leaves a lot of 
potential for the problems with harassment of civilian populations by security forces that 
we have seen throughout Guinea’s development. 
 
Analysis 
 
A key issue of Guinean security present throughout all years of this analysis is the 
oversight of military and police forces. This issue of oversight can be attributed to many 
variables, and some of them are politically based. These political causes for the lack of 
strong supervision can be separated into two categories: Guinean’s fear of limiting 
military and police forces’ ability to maintain internal stability and the role of military-led 
regimes in failing to effectively implement oversight of the security sector.  
The first section focusing on Guinean’s personal beliefs surrounding sources of 
authority has been alluded to in previous discussion. Throughout the years under Touré’s 
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rule, he himself became a strong source of political instability within the country. Touré’s 
intolerance, vindictiveness, and paranoia resulted in an internal climate of fear and 
uncertainty, which led to the mass migration of Guinean’s to neighboring countries. After 
his death, this climate of political instability lessened internally as Conté controlled 
power through much less oppressive means, yet the regional climate further cemented 
Guinean’s preference for stability without development over progress with instability. 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau became clear illustrations of anarchical conflict 
with the complete collapse of the existing political system, contributing to the Guinean 
people’s desire to maintain a peaceful environment to ensure continued stability, leaving 
development objectives as a lower priority to the main goal of maintaining cohesion.  
The military and police forces played a large role in Guinean’s views of ensuring 
the continued implementation of this cohesion. Interviews undertaken while under the 
Conté presidency illustrate the popular view that the military is the best guarantor of 
stability, and their preference that public policies continue to keep the military happy and 
ready to defend the unity of the country.167  
As the public remained hesitant to control the force of stability for the county, 
government incentives to oversee the military were never fully developed either. Under 
Touré’s presidency, the role of police and military forces was to act as another hand of 
the president’s authority. Conté, while he modestly attempted to establish some civilian 
oversight of military forces, remained the country’s only active general and exclusively 
determined military policy.168 Given his role as a general before the coup of 1984, and 
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given that he owed his position as presidency in part to the support of military forces of 
his leadership, his impartiality in controlling this sector of society was suspect. 
Predictably, evidence of the continued deregulation of security forces persisted 
throughout the Conté years.  Under his presidency, the rules governing recruitment into 
the armed forces were rarely respected.  
As well, Conté continued the policy of the Touré presidency of using military and 
police forces interchangeably, most notably through using elite military forces in policing 
and public order roles. Guinea has repeatedly seen the deployment of elite military forces 
against peaceful, unarmed civilians, many of these forces never having received training 
in proper use of lethal force. Additionally, police and gendarmerie forces, given the lack 
of strong distinction between them and more lethal forces, have also visibly committed 
unlawful killings and used excessive and arbitrary force against unarmed Guinean 
citizens.169  
This deregulation of military and police forces continued more aggressively after 
the coup of 2008. Immediately upon taking power, Camara recruited hundreds of new 
gendarmerie units without any entrance test, a requirement under the Conté years, and 
shifted their training period to be much more rapid.170 Camara also integrated back into 
active rotation military forces that had been previously dismissed for reasons of 
alcoholism, desertion, banditry, drugs, and undesirability.171 Even further, military units 
previously trained to defend the Guinean border against armed incursions from Liberia 
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and Sierra Leone were moved into a new role overseeing large public demonstrations by 
citizens.  
Another issue of the security-politics relationship throughout Guinea’s existence 
as a state has been the role of military coups in both hindering political evolution while, 
in a sense, progressing it. The first successful military coup in 1984 was a finite end to 
the Touré regime and the potential of the PDG to place another president in power and 
continue governing with little to no change from the previous administration. In this 
sense, the military coup was a means of progress for the Guinean state. It allowed the 
Conté regime to begin which, while it used undemocratic means to maintain its hold on 
power, was a big liberalization from the previous twenty-six years. Under the Conté 
administration, Guinean civil society developed, including the presence of political 
parties, opposition, NGOs, elections, freedom of press, and the ability to publicly show 
dissent.  
The Camara military coup of 2008 had a similar role in Guinean society. With the 
successful coup, Conté’s associates could not appoint another president who could 
continue to dominate politics similarly to the twenty-four years under Conté. With the 
coup, an end of that period of Guinean politics also resulted. While Camara did not 
directly liberalize the political scene within Guinea, the change in regime allowed 
Guineans to begin demanding things that they had previously not demanded under the 
previous administration—most predominantly the demand for free and fair elections with 
candidates that were separate from the military body that had originally taken power. And 
even though Camara fought, quite violently, against these demands, it was his excessive 
use of force that ended his presidential run and forced the military coup leaders to appoint 
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a non-related opposition leader as the head of the provincial government, which led to the 
elections of 2010 where a non-military president was finally elected. 
However, this use of military coups as a means of liberalization was most likely a 
side effect, or at least not the main purpose, of the coups initial intent. Both coups, with 
Conté being successful and Camara being unsuccessful, were attempts to set up long-
lasting, inherently undemocratic regimes. While Conté had opened up Guinean political 
life to include opposition, free speech, and civil society, he did not open it up so much 
that any of these new aspects of political life in Guinea could pose a direct threat to him 
in upcoming elections. And Camara, while initially advocating for a separation between 
military coup associates and the transition to civilian governance, decided to use the 
opportunity to attempt a similar shift as Conté had done. It had become a cycle of 
military coups with small political liberalizations with each new regime, but overall a 
lack of effective political change as each administration only changed what was palatable 
to its hold on power.   
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Chapter 5: Senegal 
 
Political Development 
 
Senegal has had a significantly different political development process than the 
other two countries presented in this analysis. While a single-party regime in the opening 
years of the country’s existence, the amount of control that Senghor and the UPS were 
able to exert over Senegalese society was much lower. While Senghor did have a lot of 
political currency at the nation’s conception— “Senghor…is the great Senegalese leader. 
He is political power in Senegal. Moreover, he is the secretary-general of the ‘dominant’ 
party, the UPS. Nothing can be done in Senegal against his open opposition. One can 
even imagine that with the support of the masses (which he has acquired completely) 
Senghor imposes his point of view on the other branches of the government”172—there 
were more limits imposed on his authority than the other dominant rulers in our 
comparative African states. Senegalese society itself imposed many of these limits. Five 
major problems at independence—a dry land vulnerable to droughts, huge gaps between 
urban and rural sectors, a reliance on a single major export crop (peanuts), the existence 
of hugely influential wealthy religious leaders, and the continued presence of French 
influence over government and society—had a large role in limiting Senghor’s ability to 
take risks in the political domain.173 As well, the ruling party, UPS, had less cohesion 
than other nationalist parties of the era. The UPS was more of an all-inclusive coalition of 
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political forces, rather than a strong party capable of mobilizing the masses in pursuit of 
national development goals.174 Since Senghor focused on bringing different political 
opinions under the overarching fold of the UPS, and not on indoctrinating the various 
factions of the party into his specific ideology, the UPS acted more as a federation of 
political movements rather than a proper, unified party.175 
Additionally, the nation’s first constitution did not set up a presidential regime, 
but rather a parliamentary system with a bicephalous executive. The inaugural 
constitution defined the position of President under a seven-year term, with the delineated 
roles of the office including being the chief of the army, presiding over cabinet meetings, 
and, with approval, appointing upper civil servants and army officers. The president 
circulates the law, and can send a proposed law back to the National Assembly, but must 
accede if the Assembly retains its point of view.176 The prime minister, who is designated 
by the president, has more extensive powers, including determining the nation’s policy, 
directing the actions of government, assuring the execution of the law, national defense, 
and the direction of the administration and armed forces. The National Assembly, whose 
members are elected for five-year terms by direct universal suffrage, has the power to 
vote in laws and the budget, as well as ratifying treaties and international agreements.177  
 Naturally, the implementation of this constitutional organization differed slightly 
from its description. Senghor retained a decent amount of political power due to his 
leadership of the UPS party, which was the only party in the National Assembly, as well 
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as his appointment of someone who was an ally, Mamadou Dia, to the role of Prime 
Minister. Dia was quite apt at retaining powers in his position as Prime Minister, which 
in the constitutional description is quite the important role, by reserving for himself key 
ministerial posts in important sectors for financial, economic, and administrative services. 
Senghor entrusted his associate with the day-to-day responsibilities of state 
administration, while he concentrated his own attentions on the relationship between 
Senegal and metropolitan France as well as on interterritorial politics within newly 
independent West Africa.178 
The National Assembly, while given immense power through the constitution, did 
not wield that power effectively in these foundational years. Comprised of solely UPS 
members, the ability of representatives to control the political agenda and push back 
against party lines was limited. Interestingly, since the Assembly representatives were 
elected in large electoral districts (rather than a single national list) they did retain a focus 
on representing their own regional focuses in the National Assembly, since smaller 
regions had a lot of power in deciding who represented them. This meant that individual 
representatives were more likely to push back on the government’s decisions that were 
harmful to their region.179  
 Another key difference in the Senegalese regime was the absence of a de jure 
single-party status, though a de facto one-party system was established. Senghor, a 
master of brokerage style politics, a crucial skill in the Senegalese political domain, had 
                                                           
178 Shumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy and Rural Development, 61.    
179 Milcent, “Senegal,” 120. 
 73 
absorbed or co-opted all serious opposition under the umbrella of the UPS party.180 The 
UPS did not attempt to control the totality of the nation’s life, unlike Touré’s PDG. 
Youth and labor movements were allowed to grow independently of the party, militant 
and extreme views were debated within the party congress, and perhaps most 
importantly, the party did not give direct orders to the government; representatives of the 
government, while still all members of the UPS, were more independent in their 
governmental roles.181  
In terms of opposition, however, a de facto one-party regime was created through 
the UPS’ use of persuasive and coercive strategies to ensure the absence of feasible 
organized opposition to the UPS’ control over government institutions.182 The major 
opposition party, PRA-Senegal, faced heavy discrimination in the first decade of the 
state’s existence. The party’s freedom of maneuver was greatly restricted, the 
government censored all media that published pro-PRA material, and it was nearly 
impossible for the party to hold public meetings. Additionally, several members of PRA-
Senegal’s leadership were arrested in 1961.183 This limiting of the opposition’s access to 
the public, as well as harassment from the state, established the de facto single-party 
system even though the presence of opposition parties was legal. 
In 1962, a crisis brought on by the split between Prime Minister Dia and President 
Senghor led the major changes in the balance between the political institutions found 
within the inaugural constitution. The break between the two allies was brought on by 
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supporters of President Senghor voicing their suspicions of Prime Minister Dia’s 
expansion of power within his governmental role, which they saw as leading to a 
potential coup. At the end of 1962, the relationship between the two, and their respective 
supporters, had grown increasingly strained, and ended with the arrest of Prime Minister 
Dia for his political oversteps.184 
 In the following year, the constitutional system was altered to address the 
problems of the bicephalous executive that were proven unworkable. The new 
constitution of 1963 instituted a much stronger presidential system, with the abolition of 
the role of Prime Minister and the investment of all executive power into the hands of the 
President. The increased powers of the president included the following: the elaboration 
and implementation of all national policy; many increases in law-making and executive 
rule-making authority; and new powers in policy initiation, formulation, and 
implementation.185 Furthermore, the electoral process was changed to create a single, 
nation-wide winner-take-all system based on a party list, strengthening the one-party 
structure already established within the country.186 The regime had moved a large amount 
of governmental responsibilities and roles into the executive branch, which was now 
solely occupied with the role of the President, and weakened the role of the already 
uninfluential National Assembly.  
 The first major liberalization of the one-party system came in 1974, when the 
Senegalese government passed a series of regulations that weakened the limits on 
registering political parties. This reform came about after a series of protests from both 
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urban centers, predominantly student groups, and rural sectors, predominantly peasant 
farmers, forced the UPS to adapt and reform the electoral system.187 Senghor himself 
even acknowledge the overcentralization of power, announcing in an official statement 
that the constitution of 1963 had “too often provided all agents of the State with an easy 
pretext to unload their responsibilities onto the president of the Republic.”188 These first 
amendments reestablished a government headed by a prime minister, though the 
restoration stopped short of creating another bicephalous executive. The aim was to 
deconcentrate presidential power, increase the responsibility and authority of cabinet 
ministers, and upgrade the role of the National Assembly.189  
In 1976, a more concrete liberalization of the system was passed with the 
establishment of a de jure three-party political arrangement. The UPS was given the 
preferred “social democratic” slot; the urban-oriented coalition led by Abdoulaye Wade 
received the more conservative “liberal democratic” slot; and the more extreme, 
previously banned Marxist party, the PAI, was given the “Marxist-Leninist” slot. This 
change, while a move towards democracy, was still labeled “democracy on a leash,” as 
the three slots were defined to make the UPS the preferred party with voters, as well as 
decrease the opportunity for opposition to create a coalition that might oust the dominant 
party.190 
 Even with the establishment of codified opposition (though disadvantaged), the 
UPS was able to stay in power for another twenty years. Senghor decided to step down in 
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1981, handing over the reins to Abdou Diouf, who was his Prime Minister at the time. 
The resignation was seen as a politically advantageous move for the PS, as the law of the 
country allowed Diouf to stay in the role of president until the next election cycle in 
1983, giving him two years to benefit from his unelected position to build up his support 
base and create a legitimate argument for his long-term presence in the presidential office 
when the time for elections came around.191 Diouf’s term in power was highlighted by 
the decision to end the restrictive policy on opposition parties, opening up the party 
landscape. However, the Diouf regime continued to further restrict election regulations, 
while abolishing the presidential term limits that Senghor has implemented in the 
liberalizations of the 1970s. 192  
 In 2000, a major shift in Senegalese politics arrived with the election of 
Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS party to the presidency, the first peaceful handover of the 
presidency from one party to another in all of Africa.193 This alternance was initially 
lauded by the international community as the mark of true democratic progress for the 
state, yet it soon became apparent that this progress was easily derailed. Wade, rather 
than building on progress of the previous decades of political liberalization and 
democratic institutional progress, reversed course by draining institutions of their 
substance and stripping the other branches of government of their powers, making them 
impotent.194 Many of his actions after taking office have been implemented with the 
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intent of helping himself stay in power, at the cost of many of the functional aspects of 
the democracy.  
One of the key issues of the Wade regime was the weakness of opposition. After 
the alternance, the PS became the major opposition party. Its influence was quickly 
decimated by defections, with key party membership joining the PDS in order to maintain 
their access to state resources. After Diouf ended the limit on the number of opposition 
parties, a jump in diversity was seen. Yet, by 2000 this had become a weakness of the 
Senegalese political regime, with many parties acting as “telephone-booth” parties—tiny 
organizations with few members that haphazardly participate in elections. 195 Wade was 
able to take advantage of this system, offering opposition parties incentives to join the 
majority coalition which inhibited the motivation for opposition to actually oppose the 
actions of the majority party.196 
 
Security Crises  
 
 For Senegal, the main security crises throughout the country’s development has 
been centered in the Casamance region, where rebels have maintained efforts at secession 
for decades. Yet, internationally the conflict has not gained much attention, and 
domestically the conflict has had little effect on the political development of Dakar-based 
politics. The conflict began at the end of 1982, when demonstrators in Ziguinchor 
publicly demanded independence, attacked the Senegalese flag, and chanted slogans 
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against the central government.197 The Senegalese government quickly reacted with 
political oppression and military intervention, including the arrest and sentencing of the 
movements leaders for threatening national integrity.198 This initially small uprising has 
turned into a long, protracted confrontation between the Senegalese state and the MFDC 
(Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance), which has continued, though at times 
seemingly resolved, until the present day.  
 The reasons for independence are varied depending on which source, and which 
lens—economic, political, historical, etc.—is taken. It can be argued that the issue of 
independence for the Casamançais began with the arrival of the Portuguese and has 
continued in some form into the formation of the Senegalese state. Father Diamacoune, a 
leader within the movement, has presented this argument, declaring that Casamance has 
fought for 348 years for its independence, against the Portuguese, the French, and the 
Senegalese, and is only continuing a fight which began pre-imperialist intervention. In his 
view, the Casamançais have been in active conflict for 306 of those years, and in passive 
conflict for 42 of them, including in the colonial and post-colonial periods.199  
For leaders like Father Diamacoune, the Casamance region is distinct from the 
rest of Senegal. With a different climate, different fauna and flora, and different majority 
ethnic group, there are many visible differences which can form the base of a separatist 
movement. The Jola200, a predominantly catholic ethnic group is quite separated from 
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their Wolof-speaking, Muslim neighbors who dominate the social and political spheres of 
society.  
Another large problem is the physical separation of the region from the rest of the 
country. As illustrated by the image below (Figure 1), Casamance is located underneath 
the Gambia, which can impede efforts to easily access the region. Transportation between 
Dakar and Casamance is limited to three options: a boat from Dakar to Ziguinchor, a 
route through the Gambia which can be difficult due to issues of crossing international 
borders, or even delays due to blockages in crossing the Gambian river, or going around 
the Gambia, which can add a large amount to the travel time between the two entities. 
Transportation is not always feasible between the two as well, there have been issues 
with the maritime route, which is the most efficient method of travel, after naval 
accidents, causing the region to fluctuate in its accessibility.  
 
 Figure 1: Casamance Region of Senegal201 
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Another argument for the causes of the conflict focuses, rather than distinctness of 
Casamance from the rest of the country, on the access of the Casamançais to the 
resources of the state. The Senegalese state has been accused of restricting access of Jolas 
to important posts and responsibilities, taking land that has been traditionally Jola owned, 
attempting to penetrate local society, and forcing the loss of Jola identity.202 Perhaps most 
importantly, many accusations center on the failure of Senegal to invest and develop the 
region, with many economic incentives and programs focusing solely on Dakar and the 
areas surrounding the capital city.203 Economic programs initiated in the region tend to 
monopolize the agricultural market, lower the prices for crops, and interfered negatively 
in rural production, all things which would negatively affect the villagers who rely on 
agricultural means to support themselves.204 
In 1998, a meeting between one of the MFDC’s leaders, Father Diamacoune, and 
the Senegalese First Lady, Elizabeth Diouf, represented a symbolic attempt to illustrate 
dialogue between the secessionist movement. The conversation that followed illuminates 
clearly the narrative of each side: 
ED - “Mister l’abbé, I know that you just celebrated your birthday on the 4th of 
April. I wish you a happy birthday. But the 4th of April, it is also the day of 
Senegal’s national holiday. You are thus the most Senegalese of the 
Casamançais.” 
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FD - “I thank you, Madame President. But here, we have a problem, it is the 
Senegalese army.” 
ED - “You must take action in favor of peace.” 
FD - “It is not me, Madame President, who asked for the war. It is you and your 
army who impose it on us.”  
ED - “You are a man of the church, a man of peace, you must fight for peace. I 
consider you a friend. The army isn’t here except to protect the population.” 
FD - “It is the contrary: the rebels do nothing except defend themselves. You 
must, before anything else, give the order to your army to retreat from 
Casamance.”205  
 
Throughout this conversation one can see how the opposing sides construct their 
own perspective on the conflict. For the First Lady, she begins by asserting the 
“senegality” of Father Diamacoune, and then transitions into her assertion on wanting 
peace, if only the rebels would stop resisting. For Father Diamacoune, who doesn’t 
directly respond to his supposed senegality, his narrative surrounds the image of 
Senegal’s army intruding on an otherwise calm state. For him, the future potential of 
peace between the two entities is the removal of the Senegalese military presence in the 
region. Interestingly, the issue of the actual separation of the Casamance region is not 
discussed, potentially due to the irreconcilability of both sides to the view of the other. 
After the initial confrontations between the Senegalese state and the rebels took 
place in 1982 and 1983, which led to the deaths of over one hundred people, the 
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Senegalese state attempted to take a more ambiguous, less confrontational stance on the 
region in order to lessen the ability of the MFDC rebels to recruit new soldiers. However, 
while the government attempted more diplomatic means of solving the conflict—such as 
hiring young Casamançais to work in local bureaucracy and setting up a committee of 
wise men to discuss underlying causes—there were also continued efforts to punish rebel 
movements, including increased repression and the monitoring of suspected supporters of 
the MFDC and key members of the Jola community.206  
The effect of the conflict on the general population of Casamance has been 
extremely large. Civilians face insecurity from both sides, dealing with abuses from the 
rebels themselves as well as the Senegalese army. Interviews with refugees in 
neighboring Guinea-Bissau reveal a complicated view of both rebel movements and the 
Senegalese army. One refugee details experiences with the army coming into their village 
and demanding knowledge of hidden rebels. When no one responded, the army resorted 
to shooting randomly, killing women and children, and causing the rest of the village to 
flee.207 Another refugee describes hostility towards the rebels themselves, who many 
refugees see as an instigator of the violence that forced them to leave their homes.208  
A comprehensive report by Amnesty International supports these views. 
Interviews conducted for this report relay many abuses on both sides. Amnesty has 
condemned the Senegalese army for their mistreatment of civilians, use of torture, 
unexplained disappearances, and ignorance of judicial rights. Also included in the report 
is abuses from the MFDC, including deliberate and arbitrary killings, especially of those 
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who were suspected of helping the Senegalese army, and the rebel group’s harassment of 
civilians, which includes the use of beatings, arson, and murder to get civilians to 
relinquish food, money, and even new recruits.209  
While the Amnesty report condemns both sides of the conflict for their abuses 
towards civilian populations, the report especially condemns the Senegalese army itself, 
by arguing that “these massive violations of human rights cannot be explained away as 
‘regrettable errors,’ since the Senegalese army is unanimously seen as a well-structured 
and well-disciplined army…. Senegal itself proudly claims to have republican security 
forces that obey the orders of the political authorities.”210  
The conflict has also seen a large variation in the level of violence and military 
confrontation throughout the years. In the beginning years of the conflict, the capability 
difference between the army and the rebels was striking. Descriptions of the MFDC at its 
conception portrays a group of men traveling on foot in simple jeans and T-shirts, most 
often illiterate, using old worn-down guns. Compared to the well-armed Senegalese 
army, with access to armored vehicles, helicopters, and airplanes and forces that vastly 
outnumbered the rebels, the MFDC was not an existential threat in any capacity.211  
Yet, after years of confrontation predominantly marked by violent public 
demonstrations and governmental suppression, the MFDC launched a more armed-based 
struggle in 1990 with increased attacks on military targets and civilians who were 
suspected of collaboration with Senegalese authorities.212 This shift also came with a 
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surge in weapons capabilities for the MFDC, which gained access to heavy weapons and 
rocket launchers.213 It is commonly assumed that the MFDC acquired these weapons 
through the neighboring Guinea-Bissau, which after ten years of independence conflict 
had become an demonstrated arsenal for weapons. Given the presence of predominantly 
Russian and Cuban arms within the arsenal of the MFDC, it is safe to assume that the 
weapons were bought through Guinea-Bissau, though through private operators, not 
through the Bissau-Guinean state.214 In 1997 the first mine appeared in the conflict, after 
an attack by the MFDC killed ten civilians and wounded thirty-five. Mines became a 
useful tool for the outnumbered MFDC; after the first mine attack in November 1997, 
there had already been dozens of deaths and more than 150 wounded by mines attacks by 
May of 1998.215  
Throughout the conflict there have also been many attempts at peace, but certain 
aspects make stable peace difficult to achieve. One of the biggest causes is the difficulty 
in discerning who is the leadership in the MFDC, and how much control selected 
leadership has over the rebel troops. Multiple ceasefires agreements have been negotiated 
through Father Diamacoune, a leader of the separatist movement, but scattered rebel 
groups often are not notified of the updated engagement status or choose to ignore the 
leadership of Diamacoune. During the Diouf presidency, a close friend of the president 
revealed the struggle of negotiation, even when it was the will of the central government 
to work through the conflict through dialogues: “Talk to the rebels? But we have asked 
only for that. The problem is that we do not know with whom to negotiate. They are 
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everywhere, and they are nowhere.”216 Another source alludes to Diamacoune’s tenuous 
hold on the other rebels, asserting that after he was placed on house arrest in the initial 
years of the conflict he lost both his credibility and his influence over the other resistance 
fighters.217  
And while Dakar, the international community, and rebel leaders may agree upon 
certain ceasefire or de-escalation arrangements, controlling rebel groups, and in some 
cases the Senegalese army, can be complicated in the region. Rebels know the land and 
climate, can live with local populations, and find refuge in the forest whenever necessary. 
With no structure to the wandering rebel bands, even if certain rebel factions support 
negotiations towards peace, there remains the possibility of those who disagree 
continuing to move the conflict forward.  
An especially adept illustration of this issue is shown through a peace treaty 
signed by both parties in 2004, when Father Diamacoune, then Secretary-General of the 
MFDC, and Mister Ngom, Senegalese Minister of Home Affairs, signed an accord in the 
center of Ziguinchor. While hailed as a historic moment for peace, and thus extensively 
covered by the Senegalese national media, the peace treaty was not a comprehensive end 
to the conflict. The event was a political victory for President Wade, but not presented as 
“his” peace treaty, as he did not attend the signing nor arrive to the event until after the 
signing was over. This illustrated his desire to convey a clear message that the treaty was 
signed between a Minister of Home Affairs and an insurgency leader, not between two 
heads of states.218 As well, Father Diamacoune’s authority over all of the rebels was 
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uncertain. Multiple factions within the MFDC refused to recognize him as Secretary-
General, and they followed in refusing to recognize the peace agreement.219 Attacks and 
conflict have continued past this event, with soldiers dying in clashes with rebels in 
2010220, 2011221, 2013222, and even into the current year, 2018.223 
 
Analysis 
 
Senegal presents a completely different case than the other two previously discussed 
within this text. With both Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, the major security crises mirror the 
political development of the country. However, with Senegal, security crises and political 
development appear to be almost entirely separate. Casamance, though it has been a long-
running secessionist conflict within Senegal’s borders, has not had a major effect on the 
political development of the central government.  
 A key difference between Senegal and the other two case studies presented above 
is the process of political development itself. In Guinea, the political climate of the 
country post-independence has been long period of stagnation or even regression 
followed by a burst of instability and moderate political change. Touré’s regime was a 
regressive political development period, followed by a burst of instability with the Conté 
coup of 1984. The burst was followed with further stagnation until 1990 when elections 
were first held, yet the democratic process remained uncompetitive and Conté’s power 
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was virtually unchecked throughout the rest of his presidency. 2008 became the next 
eruption of uncertainty with Conté’s death and the subsequent military coup of Captain 
Camara, who committed a massacre against his own people in his attempt to solidify his 
hold on power. This massacre led to meaningful political development with the handover 
of power from military leaders to civilian-led provisional government. Each political 
progression is a direct consequence of a security crisis; without any kind of threat, there 
is little to no political development throughout the country’s existence up until 2010.  
 Côte d’Ivoire has a similar relationship. While early political developments within 
the country were instituted under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny in reaction to the 
economic recession lessening his hold on total power, such as the opening of the country 
to elections, later developments, most importantly the end of the political exclusion of the 
north, developed in response to the use of violence to catalyze the change.  
In Senegal, political change has not been a result of security crises. In fact, 
governmental reactions to public protests has been a much bigger explanatory factor to 
progression in the governmental institutions of the country. The opening up of the single-
party system came in 1974, after the Senegalese government reacted to protests from 
students in urban centers and farmers in rural centers demanding change. Senghor 
stepped down from power through his own volition in 1981, and did so at a time where 
his successor could advantageously take advantage of the election cycle to build up a 
foundation for his presidency before he had to face the uncertainty of the vote. This led to 
a stable Diouf presidency until 2000, when the governmental systems allowed a peaceful 
transfer of power into the Wade presidency and the shift from the dominance of the PS to 
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the PDS. These evolutions were the outcomes of either public demand or the initiative of 
the politicians themselves, there were not security elements to catalyze the changes.  
If one takes the lens of public protest as a threat of future violence, then protest as a 
means of political change through security concerns can be considered. However, public 
protest is still not entirely a threat to the state unless certain evolutions take place within 
the protest movement that intensify its potential for instability, which varies based on the 
amount of the population that protests, the ability of the movement to endure over time, 
and its potential to control the authority of the central government through force. 
As well, certain aspects of the conflict have affected its ability to push for change at 
the national level. As previously discussed, Casamance is a particularly isolated region 
within Senegal. The existence of Gambia, a sovereign state, in the center of the country 
and the added difficulties of getting to Casamance without crossing Gambia due to issues 
of infrastructure means that issues plaguing the region seem especially disconnected from 
the rest of the country. This issue is heightened by the fact that the secessionist movement 
is often strongly associated with the Jola ethnicity, which only constitutes around 5 
percent of the population.224 Considering the dominance of the Wolof ethnic group, 
combined with the fact that other ethnic groups within Senegal feel no strong allegiance 
to the Casamançais movement, there isn’t much geographic or cultural strength to the 
conflict’s ability to influence other entities within the state. 
As well, in the initial period of the conflict, the military capabilities of the 
secessionist movement were insignificant compared to that of the Senegalese army. 
Previous discussions have highlighted the state of the rebels at the conflict’s 
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conception—barefoot men in t-shirts with old, worn-down guns—who posed no threat to 
the well-armed central military and illustrated no potential to move the conflict out of the 
region to threaten other areas of the country. Even as the rebel groups have evolved in 
their weapons capabilities, they have kept the violence to the Casamance region, 
centering attacks on visiting tourists, Senegalese soldiers, or other citizens of the 
Casamance region.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 Throughout this discussion, it has been clearly illustrated that, unsurprisingly, the 
relationship between security crises and political progression is clear, and quite 
complicated, in each case study. Whereas Côte d’Ivoire has one of the strongest links 
between the two concepts, and Senegal has a less strong link in terms of the effect of the 
security threat on governmental politics, what is common among the case studies is that 
these predominantly internal security threats are political in nature, and the intended 
outcome of those who wield violence or the threat of violence is to change a political 
outcome. 
 Looking back on Barry Buzan’s definition of state sociopolitical cohesiveness, 
many of the security threats discussed throughout the paper have fallen into his 
delineated list of concerns related to sociopolitical strength. Recall that ordinary weak 
states generally contain a governing power that is strong enough to override the domestic 
environment with more primordial loyalties among the populace. Given that the citizens 
of the state recognize the local loyalties more strongly than their national identity, the 
central government tends to use military power and authority as a means to strengthen a 
sociopolitical consensus on statehood.225 Because of this strong emphasis on power and 
authority, and less focus on the consent of the people in supporting an idea of nationhood, 
challengers who want control of the state target weaknesses of government power in their 
struggle for power. Security crises will this relate to this targeting, resulting in the 
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common events of sociopolitical struggle in weak states: military coups, guerilla 
movements, secessionist movements, mass uprisings, and political factionalism.226 All of 
these events target the government’s ability to maintain sociopolitical cohesion, either by 
attacking the government’s ability to wield power (military coups), or the local 
population’s willingness to let the government control the notion of statehood (guerrilla 
movements, secessionist movements, mass uprisings).  
 Each state within this analysis has witnessed an attempt at breaking down the 
government’s ability to maintain this sociopolitical cohesiveness. Côte d’Ivoire has 
experienced a military coup that developed into a long-running internal conflict between 
rebels and the central government. Guinea faced two military coups. Senegal has lived 
through decades of secessionist conflict.  
As well, each state witnessed the government’s reaction to these threats, which 
became as much a security crisis for the population as the original threat itself. Citizens 
of Côte d’Ivoire lived through the eight-year conflict, facing insecurity from the violence 
between the government and rebels, as well as potential violence from Liberian funded 
rebel groups coming in from the west. Guineans experienced mass oppression during the 
Touré regime as he acted on his fears of losing his authority over the population. They 
also faced the large public massacre as a result of Camara’s attempts to break down the 
public protests, a threat to his use of power to uphold his government. Senegalese 
citizens, particularly those who live in Casamance, face violence from both the rebels of 
the secessionist movement and reactive violence from the Senegalese army, an issue that 
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warranted a scathing report from Amnesty International on the abuse of military and 
rebel personnel towards the inhabitants of the region.  
 From this theoretical lens, an analysis can be made surrounding the political 
intents of the security threats as well. Côte d’Ivoire’s attempted military coup was an 
attempt by the MPCI to take control of the central authority of the state so that they could 
reinstate the ability of the north to participate in politics. When they were unsuccessful at 
taking control of the major cities of the southern region of the country, the conflict settled 
into a stalemate as each side waited for either a military means of achieving their political 
goals, or an acceptable diplomatic resolution. As well, it can be argued that the concept of 
Ivoirité and the resulting exclusion of the north was developed because Bédié and 
subsequent political leaders did not have enough sociopolitical strength to maintain their 
hold on power. The exclusion was a means of reinforcing a tenuous hold on authority by 
the government.  
Guinea’s military coups were often explained by the coup throwers as a reaction 
to the poor governance of the previous administration; they were a reaction to the 
previous administration’s abuse of its authority to maintain its hold on power. These 
abuses were prevalent partially to compensate for the weaker hold on sociopolitical 
cohesion of the Guinean government. Senegal’s secessionist movement developed when 
a local minority within the country decided that the government, and the state of Senegal, 
did not represent their national identity, and thus did not have the right to administer 
them. 
  As well these security crises have interesting relationships to overall political 
development; Côte d’Ivoire’s eight-year conflict led to a more democratic political 
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process without northern exclusion and Guinea’s military coups resulted in slight 
liberalizations in the new administrations and were an impetus for political change. 
Meanwhile, Senegal’s Casamance conflict has not had a large enough impact to affect 
government institutions in Dakar. When an ordinary weak state faces a threat to the 
government’s ability to promote a certain idea of statehood—whether it be military coup, 
secessionist conflict, or other—once the conflict has been resolved, the government’s 
previous method of sociopolitical cohesion cannot be maintained.  
Côte d’Ivoire’s government first used patronage, then the idea of Ivoirité, to help 
the government maintain control over the entire country. Once the conflict had ended, the 
state could not return to patronage nor Ivoirité to maintain a new idea of statehood, as 
those had already proven too weak to impose unity in the absence of a strong national 
identity. As a result, the state implemented new elections, with the political participation 
of the northern half of the country, to establish a new government system that was strong 
enough to impose unity on the entire state. 
Guinea had a similar experience. First the government used extreme oppression, 
then undemocratic processes and a strong respect for military forces, to help maintain the 
central government’s hold on the entire territory. Each military coup broke down the 
levers of power that the previous administration had used, and with each military coup 
Guinean citizens grew bolder in what they were willing to demand from the government. 
As such, Conté could not use extreme repression to maintain control, and Camara could 
not use illegitimate electoral processes to continue his leadership of the country. After 
Camara responded to this shift in authority with violence, which decreased the 
government’s ability to control the population, a shift to a fair and more legitimate 
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election was necessary to give the government a consensus once again that it could 
decide what statehood meant.  
Senegal presents in intriguingly unique situation in comparison. The government 
never lost its ability to control the idea of statehood; it is a stronger state in comparison to 
the other two case studies, potentially falling into the middle ground category outlined by 
Buzan. While the secessionist movement has tried to dislodge the government’s authority 
in the southern region, it has been unsuccessful in both that objective, and in enacting any 
change in the central government’s institutions. As a stronger state, the government of 
Senegal relies less on the use of authority and power to maintain Senegal’s statehood, and 
relies more heavily on the consensus of Senegalese citizens with the government on the 
idea of statehood. This, combined with the secessionist movements inability to threaten 
the central government’s hold on power, results in a secessionist conflict that has not 
resulted in large evolutions for the government itself.  
Thus we reach an interesting conclusion. When a state lies on the lower end of the 
spectrum of sociopolitical cohesion, making it a weaker state, large security threats result 
in a shift of government institutions. These shifts are usually democratic in nature, as the 
government needs to either increase its power to control the population, which is 
weakened after facing a large threat, or attempt to become a stronger state. To become a 
stronger state, the government must foster a stronger consensus between citizens and the 
government on what the state is. This can be achieved by increasing political 
participation, holding elections, and giving citizens a bigger role in their own 
administration—all factors of political development as defined within this analysis. Once 
a state becomes stronger on the sociopolitical spectrum, internal threats lessen their 
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ability to attack the weakness of the country as a state, and security concerns began to 
rely more heavily on external threats, the traditional view of security. While violence and 
politics are inherently intertwined topics, they need not be as strong as some cases 
explored within this analysis. 
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